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WELLS AND STREAMS: RELATIONSHIP AT LAW
PETER N. DAWvsl

Groundwater constitutes one of the major sources of water for municipalities, irrigators, and rural dwellers. Conflicts between groundwater users
are bound to arise from time to time, as is evidenced by a recent Missouri
case, Higday v. Nickolaus, discussed elsewhere in this issue.' Such conflicts
may increase in frequency in the future as the demand for groundwater
increases. Although a majority of cases will involve allocation of groundwater between users of that class of water, many groundwater diversion
cases will involve adverse effects on the flow of water in streams. It is -to
the latter situation that this article is directed.
Consider a typical case involving the intimate relationship between
groundwater and surface watercourses. In the late 1950's, a water utility
installed a well on its 10 acre tract in a rural area in New York. Nearby
was small pond and swamp which fed a brook that flowed across a neighboring farmer's land. In the past, the brook had apparently never ceased
to flow. In 1959, the utility began diverting groundwater from its*well
to its distribution system some distance away. The brook dried up at that
time and never flowed again except during the spring and after heavy
rains. The jury apparently believed plaintiff farmer's professional witness'
testimony that there was an intimate hydrologic connection between the
percolating groundwater supply and the brook; that the base flow of the
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; formerly
General Attorney, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service,
Natural Resource Economics Division, Madison, Wisconsin. B.A., Haverford College, 19591"LL.B., University of Wisconsin, 1963; S.J.D., University of Wisconsin,
1972.
Preliminary research work done by J. Peter DeBraal, attorney for the U.S.
Departmeni of Agriculture, and by John Greenman and Chris Koepke, legal re-

search assistants for the Department, has been drawn upon with permission. Some
of the research, all analysis of the cases, and the writing of this article were done
by the-author subsequent to his leaving the Department. The opinions expressed
are the author's own and are not necessarily those of the Department.
1. 469 S.W.2d 859 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971). See Thomas, Water Law-Groundwater Rights in Missouri-A Need for Clarification,37 Mo. L. REv. 357 (1972).
(189)
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brook was provided by flow of groundwater into the stream where the
water table intersected the stream; and that defendant utility's well had
lowered the water table below the bed of the brook and deprived it of
that source of water. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed a verdict for
plaintiff farmer. Quoting from earlier cases, the court reached its decision
by applying surface watercourse rules to the situation; it held that the well
had caused an unlawful interference with a surface watercourse. On the
question of the relationship between percolating groundwater, to which
one set of rules applies, and surface watercourses, to which a different set
of rules applies, the court said:
"That the diversion and diminution of the stream were caused by
arresting and collecting the underground waters, which, percolating
through the earth, fed the stream, does not affect the question.
When the fact was established upon the proofs that the defendant's
works and wells had caused, by this subsidence of water, a diversion
of the stream's natural flow in its channel, the injury was proved,
and the plaintiff's cause of action established." 2
This language raised more questions than it answered. Will any reduction in the flow of a surface watercourse caused by a groundwater diversion
be actionable? Are there any judicial guidelines on when surface watercourse rules should be applied and when percolating groundwater rules
should be applied? What precedent is there to support the position taken
by the supreme court in the case just discussed? Although the various rules
concerning allocation of groundwater have been analyzed extensively in
the literature, 3 very little has been written about the allocation rules concerning the hydrologic relationship between percolating groundwater and
surface watercourses. This article is intended to fill that void.
I. MIssouaI CASES
The Missouri courts have been concerned with the relationship between
groundwater and surface watercourses more often than one would expect
considering the paucity of cases involving groundwater which have been
reported in the state. 4 The two Missouri cases which discuss the legal con2. Stevens v. Spring Valley Water Works & Supply Co., 42 Misc. 2d 86, 95,
247 N.Y.S.2d 503, 511 (Sup. Ct. 1964), quoting Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 160 N.Y.
357, 361, 54 N.E. 787, 788 (1899).
3. See, e.g., Cross, Ground Waters in the Southeastern States, 5 S.C.L.Q. 149

(1952); Ellis, Water Law in Eastern United States, 18 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERv.
19 (Jan.-Feb. 1963); Hanks & Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey: Groundwater, 24 RUTGERS L. RE,. 621 (1970); Maloney &Plager, Florida'sGround Water:
Legal Problems in Managing a Precious Resource, 21 U. MiAMI L. REv. 751
(1967); Comment, The Law of Underground Water: A Half Century of Huber v.
Merkel, 1953 Wis. L. Rlv. 491.
4. Out of six cases involving groundwater, two concern the relationship between groundwater and surface watercourses. See Haynor v. -Excelsior Spnngs
Light, Power, Heat & Water Co., 129 Mo. App. 691, 108 S.V. 580 (K.C. Ct. App.
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sequences illustrate the convolutions the courts throughout the United
States have gone through in wrestling with fact situations to which no
established doctrine dearly applied. In Springfield Waterworks Co. v.
Jenkins,5 the plaintiff water company obtained water for sale in Springfield
from a large spring on defendant's land. The spring was located about 1/4
mile from the Little Sac River and was separated from the river by a
high limestone ridge. Defendant had constructed a dam at the confluence
of two other springs which joined to form the river. He had attempted to
sell the dam to plaintiff on the theory that the river water either percolated
or flowed through underground channels to the spring. Plaintiff refused
to buy. Defendant then began a practice of completely stopping the flow
of the river for six days a week, storing the water, and flushing all of it
into the river on Sundays. He did this during a time of drought for the
ostensible purpose of flushing silt and debris from his reservoir. The
effect of his practice was to render the flow of water from the spring
inadequate to supply plaintiff's customers.
The court found the applicable law to be as follows:
The law in reference to the obstruction or diversion of the flow
of water in water courses is well established, and it can make no difference that the current or stream is subterranean, provided it has a
well defined and known channel. Subterranean passages for water
are common in limestone formations, where streams pass entirely
under the surface of the ground, and so continue in definite and
obvious channels for greater or less distances. No one has the right
to interfere with the natural flow of such a stream. But the law, as
applicable to water which filtrates or percolates through the soil or
interstices of the rock, is almost the reverse. Such water is regarded
as a part of the soil and to which an adjoining proprietor has no
absolute or natural right, and to which he can acquire no prescriptive right. It belongs to the owner of the land, and its diversion
or appropriation by him for the improvement or benefit of his
estate can not be made the basis of a complaint against him by
anyone, however grievous the resulting injury may be.6
Although the Missouri courts have since rejected the natural flow formula-

1908); Springfield Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74 (St. L. Ct. App.
1895). The other four cases, which will not be discussed further in this article, are:

Reddick v. Pippin, 421 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1967) (pollution of well by percola-

tion of sewage from sewage lagoon); Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 327 Mo.
238, 37 S.W.2d 518 (1931), rev'g on other grounds 2 S.W.2d 115 (Spr. Mo. App.
1927) (well and spring pollution from leaking pipeline); Higday v. Nickolaus, 469
S.W.2d 859 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971) (proposed lowering of water table by pumping
of groundwater from well field); Ingram v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., 153 S.W.2d
547 (K.C. Mo. App. 1941) (destruction of aquifer feeding a spring by blasting).
Only the Higday decision is important among the four so far as development of
legal doctrine is concerned.
5. 62 Mo. App. 74 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895).
6. Id. at 80.
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tion of the riparian doctrine7 and the "reasonable use" rule for groundwater allocation, s it is clear from the court's language that the choice of
rule was not clear. The court found both that the evidence left no doubt
that plaintiff's spring depended largely on the flow in the river and that
it was not shown whether that water reached the spring by a well-defined
channel or by percolation even though the flow pattern of the spring
followed that of the river by five or six hours. On these findings, one might
expect that the percolating groundwater rule would have been applied
and judgment would have gone to defendant. Such a result would have
been reinforced by the application of the "reasonable use" groundwater
rule, discussed in the case, that a groundwater user may use such water
only on his overlying land and therefore does not have any right to sell
groundwater off the land which he is entitled to protect. Nonetheless, the
court gave judgment to plaintiff because defendant had cut off plaintiff's
water supply for malicious motives; that is, to force plaintiff to buy his
dam.9
Why did the court reach the result it did? It held, in effect,- that the
presumption that groundwater is percolating water rather than an underground stream had not been overcome. Hence, the riparian rules applicable
to underground streams could not be applied. Under the percolating
groundwater rule announced, plaintiff had no enforceable rights. Although
defendant had acted maliciously, there was no way the court could create
a legal relationship between the parties under the water allocation rules
existing at the time. But the court created a legal relationship nonetheless.
What the court did was to recognize a hydrologic connection between the
,iver and the spring even though at that time scientists had not developed
a theory to explain the phenomenon. The court held that the water in
the river somehow flowed to and out of the spring:
While it must be conceded that the water from the channel
of the "Little Sac" river to the Fulbright spring flows through
no perceptible channel, and that the defendants must be regarded
as the general owner of the surplus water flowing from their spring,
such ownership is not without restrictions against the plaintiff,
for it, by reason of its appropriation, has acquired a right thereto
which can not be interfered with by a stranger, nor by the defendants, except for some beneficial use of the water or for the betterment of their land. The defendants can not obstruct or divert the
water merely for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff.10
The court cited an equitable doctrine: "If a man in the exercise of his
own rights of property do damage to his neighbor, he is liable, if it might
7. See Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964).
8. Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971).
9. Springfield Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74, 81-82 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1895).
10. Id. at 82.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss2/1
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have been avoided by the use of reasonable care." 1 ' It could not have done
so without recognizing the causal relationship created by the hydrologic
connection between the river and the spring.
In a later case, the existence of a hydrologic connection between a
stream and a'well was recognized in an even more ambiguous manner. In
Haynor v. Excelsior Springs Light, Power, Heat & Water Co.,12 defendant
allowed oil or grease to escape into a creek. It percolated with water to
plaintiff's well, located 100 feet from the stream. Basing its reasoning on
nuisance, the court said:
[Defendant] had no right to pollute the stream and thereby work
an injury to its lower neighbors. The manner in which it threw
refuse into the stream could not possibly be of any consequence.
Plaintiff's cause of action arose from the fact that defendant used
the watercourse as a sewer and that she sustained an injury to her
property rights in consequence thereof.13
This recognition of proximate cause required an implied recognition of a
hydrologic connection between the stream and the well.
These cases do not tell us very much about how the courts will treat
similar problems in the future or what rules will be applied. Something
beyond an implied recognition of the hydrologic connection between
percolating groundwater and surface watercourses is needed if the law
is to serve its function of guiding behavior. Two questions must be answered. First, when does a hydrologic connection exist? Second, will surface
watercourse, percolating groundwater, or other rules be applied in various
types of situations? The courts have had to deal with these problems from
time to time. This article will examine the reported decisions in the United
States, England and Ireland to determine if any trends have been established in spite of the absence of a clear doctrine in point.

II.

HYDROLOGIC PRINCIPLES

An analysis of the reported cases must be made in the context of the
water migration characteristics of the hydrologic cycle. Hydrologists have
asserted that the law has failed to recognize the existence of the hydrologic
cycle and charge the courts to remedy the deficiency. Specifically, they
assert that the law fallaciously recognizes three classes of water-diffused
surface water, groundwater, and surface watercourses-and that each has
been treated as being independent of the others.' 4 To understand that assertion, and its relevance to the question being examined in this article, the
hydrologic cycle must be explained.
11. Id., quoting Charles V. Rankin, 22 Mo. 566, 573 (1856).
12. 129 Mo. App. 691, 108 S.W. 580 (K.C. Ct. App.- 1908).
18. Id. at 697, 108 S.W. at 582.
14. See, e.g., A. PIPER, INTERPRETATION AND CURRENT STATUS OF GROUNDwATER RHxoTS (U.S. Geo. Survey Circ. No. 432, 1960); H. THOMAS, THE CoNsavRA-

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [1972], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol.- 37

A. Hydrologic Cycle

.

About 97 percent of the earth's water supply is contained in the oceans.
The remaining three percent is fresh water and is located as follows:
Item
Polar ice and glaciers
Groundwater:
(1) Fissures to 2500 ft.
(2) Fissures 2500 ft. to 12,500 ft.
Lakes
Soil Moisture
Atmosphere
Rivers
Plants and animals
Hydrated earth minerals
Total

Million
acre-feet
24,668,000

Percent of
total fresh water
74.72

3,648,000
4,565,000
101,000
20,400
11,500
933
915
336

11.05
13.83
0.31
0.062
0.035
0.003
0.003
0.001

33,016,084

100.00

The over three-quarters of the total fresh water supply on earth locked
up in ice or at great depth in the earth is not presently available to -man
for use.15 Hence, as a theoretical maximum, man has access to less than
one percent of the earth's water resources.
The oceans cover more than 70 percent of the earth's surface and
absorb the major portion of the sun's radiant energy. About one-half of
that energy is used to evaporate sea water. Most of the atmospheric water
is obtained by this process. 13 Atmospheric circulation carries the evaporated
243-47 (1951); H. THOMAS, GROUND WATERk AND THE LAW
(U.S. Geo. Survey Circ. No. 446, 1961); Piper & Thomas, Hydrology and Water
Law: What is Their Future Common Ground?, in WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW
7 (1958); Thomas, Hydrology vs. Water Allocation in the Eastern United States,
in THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 165, 169-70 (D.
Haber &S. Bergen ed. 1958); Bower, Some Physical, Technologicali and Economic
Characteristics of Water and Water Resource Systems: Implications for Administration, 3 NAT. REs. J. 215, 218-19 (1963); Thomas & Leopold, Ground Water in
North America, 143 SCIE.NCE 1001 (1964).
TION OF GROUND WATER

15. W. ACKERMANN & G. LoF, TECHNOLOGY IN AMERIcAN WATER DLrvELoPmENT
11-13 (1959) (percentage figure for soil moisture corrected).
One acre-foot of water equals 43,560 cubic feet or 325,851 gallons. Conceptually, it is one acre of area covered with one foot of water. It is the unit of
measure commonly used to designate the quantity of water in reservoirs -and
other large bodies of water and the quantity supplied by irrigation systems.

16. J. HIRSHLEIFER, J. DEHAVEN & J. MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPLY: ECONOMICS,
TECHNOLOGY, AND POLICY 8 (1960); Ackermann, Colman & Ogrosky, From Ocean

to Sky to Land to Ocean, in WATER: THE YEARBOOK
Clark, Plan and Scope of the Work, in 1 WATERS AND
Clark ed. 1967).

OF AGRICULTURE 41
WATER RIGHTS 1,

(1955);

10-11 (R.

The sources of atmospheric water are as follows:
Oceans
80,000 cubic miles per year
Lakes and land areas
15,000 cubic-miles per year
Ackerman et al., supra at 41; Clark, supra note 16, at 11.
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water to the continents, where it condenses and precipitates to the ground. 17
Although precipitation on the oceans returns directly to the oceanic water
supply to irecycle again to the atmosphere, precipitation over land, in
the form of rain, hail, snow, frost, or dew, splits along four paths:
1. One part, perhaps as much as half, returns to the atmosphere
directly by evaporation.
2. A second part, perhaps a sixth, is returned to the atmosphere
by transpiration of plants.
8. A third part, perhaps a third, joins streams or glaciers that
discharge into the ocean, where it can be returned to the atmosphere.
4. The fourth part, a small but important fraction, enters the
ground, but in time returns to the surface, as springs or other
groundwater discharge, and from there is returned to the atmosphere . 8
About 72 percent of "the 30 inches of average annual precipitation in the
United States, or about 21% inches, returns to the atmosphere by evaporation or transpiration and is not available for man's use. The remainder,
about 8 inches, is our available source of water.' 9 Most of it appears as
runoff, either flowing directly over the surface of the land to streams and
rivers or percolating into and through the ground to streams and rivers.
From there it returns to the oceans to recycle again. Very little becomes
trapped in subsurface reservoirs.2 0 The operative fact expressed by the
concept of the hydrologic cycle is the interrelationship of its different phases
and the continuity of migration no matter where water is found.
In the United States as a whole, about 33 to 40 percent of the total
runoff, or a little over 3 inches annually, percolates into the ground. 2'
17. Precipitation over the land surfaces of the earth is about 24,000 cubic
miles per year. Ackermann et al., supra note 16, at 41; Clark, supra note 16, at 11.
18. C. HUNT, PHYSIOGRAPHY OF THE UNITED STATES 71 (1967). See generally
J. Hirshleifer et al., supra note 16, at 8; Ackerman et al., supra note 16; Linsley,
Hydrology, in 11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRiTANNICA 959 (1967).
19. J. Hirshleifer et al., supra note 16, at 15, citing G. McGuINNESs, THE
WATER SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES,

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO GROUND

WATER 66 (U.S. Geo. Survey Circ. No. 114, 1951); Clark, supra note 16, at 13. In
Missouri, the average annual precipitation is 40 inches, of which 11 inches is
average annual runoff. C. McGuINNESS, THE ROLE OF GROUND WATER IN THE NATIONAL WATER SITUATION 457-58 (U.S. Geo. Survey Water Supply Paper No. 1800,

1963).
20. This is especially true in humid areas where total precipitation exceeds
evaporation and the distribution of the surplus is widespread. In these areas the
surface and underground storage remain near their natural equilibrium levels.
Additions to these storages, will be balanced by the consequent overflows which
eventually appear as flows in surface watercourses reaching the oceans. J. HIRSHLEIFER et al., supra note 16, at 19 n.10.
21. Id. at 19, citing C. McGuINNESS, THE vVATER SITUATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO GROUND WATER 84 (U.S. Geo. Survey Circ.
No. 114, 1951). Excluded from this figure is water which returns to the surface
by capillary forces and is evaporated, and that which is captured by plants and
is transpired.
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This water descends through the soil, where some of it is captured by soil
particles by molecular attraction. In common parlance, this is the "wetting"
of the soil. Amounts of this water which exceed that which can be -held
by molecular attraction in the "zone of aeration" will descend to the-"zone
of saturation"-where water fills the interstices between the soil particles.
Beneath the "zone of saturation" will be a stratum of impervious soil or
rock through which water cannot pass. Under the force of gravity, water
in the "zone of saturation" will flow downhill-at a rate determined by
soil permeability and strata gradient-until it either becomes trapped in
a groundwater reservoir or reaches the surface and passes into a stream,
lake, or ocean. The top of the "zone of saturation" is the water table. Since
under natural conditions most groundwater reservoirs remain filled to
their equilibrium level, most percolating groundwater must eventually
find its way to the surface-where it continues to the ocean. 22
B. Hydrologic Relationship Between Groundwater
and Surface Watercourses

Groundwater will return to the surface at any point where the water
table reaches the level of the surface, as at springs, or where it is higher
than the level of a stream. Such a stream, which is fed by groundwater flow,
is designated an effluent stream.2 3 The base flow of most streams, after
surface runoff following precipitation has ceased, has as a major component such a groundwater discharge. 24 If the level of a stream is above
the water table and the stream bed is permeable (or leaky), water in the
stream will percolate into the groundwater supply. 25 Such a stream is
designated an influent stream. If the soil is sufficiently permeable, the
stream water will percolate out quickly enough to keep the interstices of
soil filled and, in effect, create a mound in the water table. If the soil
is insufficiently permeable to maintain that condition, stream water will
descend through a "zone of aeration" to the water table in the same manner
as precipitation does from the surface of the ground. In the former condition, it can be said that there is a direct hydrologic contact between the
22. See generally C. HUNT, supra note 18, at 74-76;. Ackermann et-al.,
supra note 16, at 46-49; Sayre, Ground Water, in 10 ENCYCLOPAEDA BirrANNICA
949, 950-51 (1967); Thomas, Underground Sources of Our Water, -in WATER: THE
YEARBOOK or AGRICULTURE 62, 64-74 (1955).
23. C. Hunt, supra note 18, at 76, 79, R. LINSLEY, JR., M. KOHLER & J.
PAULHUs, HYDROLOGY FOR ENGINEERS 123 (1958); Ackermann- et al., supra note
16, at 49; Bower, supra note 14, at 218-19; Clark, supra note 16, at 18 nA7, citing
C. MCGUINNESs, THE ROLE OF GROUND WATER IN THE NATIONAL WATER SITUATION
13 (U.S. Geo. Survey Water Supply Paper No. 1800, 1963); Tolman & Stipp,
Analysis of Legal Concepts of Subflow and Percolating Waters, 21 ORE. L. REv.

113, 115-18 (1942); Wiel, Need of Unified Law for Surface and Underground
CAL. L. Rv. 358, 359-64 (1929).
24. Clark, supra note 16, at 18 n.47, citing, C. McGUINNESS, supra note 23, at
13. The remainder of the base flow comes from lakes and swamps.

Water, 2 S.

25. See authorities cited in note 23, supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss2/1
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stream and the water table and that rate of flow from one to the other
will depend upon the difference of level between them. In the latter
condition, there is no direct hydrologic connection and the rate of flow
will be independent of the difference in level between them; it will be
determined only by the permeability of the soil beneath the stream.2 6
But in either condition, there is a hydrologic relationship between the
stream and the percolating groundwater supply.
C. Effect of Pumping from a Well
When groundwater is pumped from a well, it must be replaced from
the surrounding groundwater supply. The amount of groundwater flowing
to the well must equal the amount pumped or the well eventually will
run dry. Since water only will flow downhill, a hydraulic gradient must
develop around the well steep enough to create the necessary flow to the
well. The steepness of the gradient will be determined by the pumping
rate and the soil permeability. A large dimple in the water table is created
which is designated a "cone of depression." 27 For high capacity wells,
these cones of depression can become extremely large and deep; the lowering
of the water table two to three miles distant from such a well has been
reported.2 8 It was the fear of just this effect that prompted the lawsuit in
Higday v. Nickolaus.2 9 Under conditions of bad placement or high pumpage, the cone of depression from one well can lower the water table below
the bottoms of nearby wells. 0 This is the situation which has engendered
hundreds of lawsuits.
A well can affect the flow of a nearby stream. It can affect an effluent
stream, one which is fed by groundwater, in either of two ways. First, it
can intercept groundwater which would otherwise percolate to the stream,
even though its cone of depression does not reach the stream itself. Second,
its cone of depression can reach the stream, lower the water table, and
convert the steam from an effluent stream to an influent stream. A well
can also affect an existing influent stream, but only if the cone of depression reaches the stream under conditions where the water table otherwise
would be in hydraulic contact with it. Under these conditions, the well
will steepen the hydraulic gradient and increase the flow from the stream
to the groundwater supply. If the water table is not in hydraulic contact
with the stream, but passes under it and is separated from it by a "zone
of aeration," a lowering of the water table under the stream by a cone
of depression will not increase the percolation from the stream. Where
the cone of depression does not reach the stream, the well is merely inter26.
27.
Tolman
28.
29.
30.

Tolman & Stipp, supra note 23, at 117-18.
R. LINSLEY, JR. et al., supra note 23, at 184-40; Sayre, supra note 22, at 951;
&Stipp, supra note 23, at 119-20.
See Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522, 58 N.E. 644 (1900).
See note 4, supra.
R. LiNSLEY, JR. et al., supra note 23, at 139.
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cepting the percolating water after it has left the stream and cannot affect
the rate of iniluent flow.8 1
III.

GROWTH OF GROUNDWATER USAGE

The conflicts between various groundwater users and between groundwater users and surface watercourse users are likely to increase in the
future as the demands for water increase. In 1950, groundwater withdrawals
in the United States averaged 30 to 85 billion gallons per day, about 17
to 20 percent of total withdrawals from all sources.8 2 By 1980, the demand
for water will be twice the total of 175 to 200 billion gallons a day used
in 1955, and the demand for groundwater probably will make up one-half
of this total.33 This represents a threefold increase in groundwater usage.
We are already well along that road. The conflicts between users cannot
help but increase and the law must be prepared to deal with them.
IV.

LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF WATERS

The basic concepts concerning water allocation recognized by the common law seem to be proof of the hydrologists' assertion that various "classes"
of water are treated as if they were independent entities. 34 Water allocation rules are divided into three major categories according to the type of
water dealt with: surface watercourses, diffused surface water, or groundwater.8 5 Treatises and articles on water allocation law make these basic
classifications. 36 The rules of water allocation for each class are phrased
to apply to conflicts between users of the same class of water and are usually
applied by the courts in this manner. A description of the major rules for
each class of water will illustrate this proposition.

31. R. LINSLEY, JR. et al., supra note 23, at 139-140; Tolman & Stipp, supra
note 23, at 119-20.
32. Thomas, supra note 22, at 63; The size of groundwater withdrawals and
the percentage of total withdrawals from all sources for various purposes in that
year were as follows:
Use

Groundwater Withdrawals (1950)
Percent of total withdrawals
Amount (bgd) for that purposefrom all sources

Rural
3.5
80
Municipal
3.5
25
Industrial
5.5
7
Irrigation
20.0
25
33. Id.; C. McGUINNESS, supra note 23, at 83.
34. See authorities cited note 14 supra.
35. See, e.g., W. HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEIS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGIrs
IN THE WEST 1-2 (U.S. Dep't Agric. Misc. Pub. No. 418, 1942). See also 56 AM.
JUR. Waters §§ 3, 6. 65, 101-02 (1947); 6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 28.55,
.61, .65 (A.J. Casner ed. 1954); 93 C.J.S. Waters §§ 2-3, 86, 112 (1956).
36. Treatises on water law specifically or on property law generally: H.
COULSON & U. FORBES, LAW OF WATERS, SEA, TIDAL, AND INLAND AND LAND DRAINAGE 220 (6th ed. 1952); J. GOULD, LAW OF WATERS
WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 31 (3d ed.
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A. Surface Watercourses
1. Riparian Rights
There are two major allocation doctrines which apply to water in
surface watercourses in the United States. In the humid eastern states,
the riparian doctrine holds sway. It states that each proprietor whose land
abuts upon a watercourse is entitled to have its waters come down to him
unaltered in quantity or quality, subject to the co-equal right of each
proprietor to make reasonable uses of the waters. What constitutes a reasonable use is determined by the circumstances of each case. Although it
is usually said that only riparian proprietors-those whose lands abut upon
the watercourse-are entitled to make use of the waters, under certain
circumstances nonriparians may be granted a right to use them.3 7 A major
characteristic of riparianism is that it defines the relationship between
users of water in a surface watercourse. It says nothing about .the rights
of riparians who are injured by diverters of groundwater which feeds a
surface watercourse.
2.

Prior Appropriation

In the dry western states, rights to water in surface watercourses are
determined by the prior appropriation doctrine. This doctrine rests on
the maxim "first in time, first in right." The first landowner to establish
a right to divert water is the last person to be cut off in time of shortage.
When water supplies are inadequate, the most junior right is cut off first;
thereafter, rights are cut off in inverse order of seniority until the quantity

(1962); W. BURBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL
48-49, 57, 59-60 (3d ed. 1965); J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
297 (1962); H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 380, 386,

RIvERs AND WATERCOURSES 5-8

PROPERTY
PROPERTY

388 (3d ed. abr. 1970).
Treatises and articles on the water law of specific states (alphabetically

by states):
F.

MALONEY, S. PLAGER &

F.

BALDWIN, JR., WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION: THE

FLORIDA EXPERIENCE 141-42 (1968); F. MANN, H. ELLIS & N. KRAUSZ, WATER-USE
LAW IN ILLINOIS 8 (U. of Ill. Agric. Expt. Sta. Bull. No. 703, 1964); P. GALBREATH,
MARYLAND WATER LAW 1-2 (1965); Arens & Haber, Michigan Law of Water Al-

location, in THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 377,
379, 387-88, 393 (D. Haber & S. Bergen ed. 1958); T. LAUER, MISSOURI WATER LAW
3 (1966); Hanks, Law of Water in New Jersey: PartI, 22 RUTGERS L. REv. 621, 626
(1968); Ellis, Some Legal Aspects of Water Use in North Carolina, in THE LAW
OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 189, 192 (D. Haber & S.
Bergen ed. 1958); Comment, Water Rights in Tennessee, 27 TENN. L. REv. 557,
558 (1960); W. HUTCHINS, THE TEXAS LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 515, 558 (1961);
Lugar, Water Law in West Virginia, 66 W. VA. L. REv. 191, 192 (1964); H. ELLIS,
J. BEUSCHER, C. HOWARD &

J.

DEBRAAL, WATER-UsE LAW AND ADMINISTRATION IN

WISCONSIN 12-14 (1970).
37. See, e.g., Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (No. 14,312) (C.C.D.R.I.
1827); Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); Bollinger v. Henry,
375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964). Cf. Davis, Australian and American Water Allocation
Systems Compared, 9 B.C. INDUS. 8CCoM. L. REv. 647, 676-88 (1968); Lauer, Reflections on Riparianism, 35 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1970).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [1972], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

of water to be diverted again equals the available supply. Rights are established by posting or giving notice of intent to divert, followed by applying
the water to a beneficial use within a reasonable time. A beneficial use is
defined as an application of water which results in an economic benefit
to the appropriator and involves actual physical control over the water
by diversion or retention. The appropriative right is not related to ownership of land abutting upon the stream, but on physical appropriation of
water; hence, the water may be put to use anywhere and by anyone, whether
riparian or nonriparian. 38 Like riparianism, prior appropriation is phrased
in terms of the rights of various landowners to use water in surface watercourses. Unlike riparianism, however, the doctrine has been extended in
some western states to include sources of water tributary to streams and
to supporting groundwater. These extensions of the doctrine are the only
clear extension of surface watercourse law to other classes of water and
will be discussed later.39
B. Diffused Surface Water
There are three rules which various states have applied to the management of diffused surface water. This is water which flows over the
surface of the ground and is not located within the beds and banks of a
stream. The law of diffused surface water deals principally with the problem of getting rid of it. The three rules are the "common enemy" rule,
the "civil law" rule, and the "reasonable use" rule. The "common enemy"
rule states that each landowner may use his land as he sees fit, and that
he may change its surface to fight off or control diffused surface water
draining onto or off of his land by retention, diversion, repulsion, or
altered transmission without liability to his neighbors.4" The "civil law"
rule requires each landowner to accept natural drainage from land lying
above his own and prohibits the upper landowner from concentrating or
redirecting drainage to lower lands.4 1 The "reasonable use" rule allows a

landowner to make reasonable uses of his land and to make reasonable

38. See, e.g., Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch
Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882); Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205

F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913) (applying Colorado law); Crawford v. Lehi Irrigation Co.,
10 Utah 2d 165, 350 P.2d 147 (1960). Cf. Davis, supra note 87, at 688-97.
39. See text accompanying notes 108-20 infra.
40. See, e.g., Gannon v. Hargadon, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 106 (1865); Casa-

nover v. Villanova Realty Co., 209 S.W.2d 556 (St. L. Mo. App. 1948); Watters

v. National Drive-In, Inc., 266 Wis. 432, 63 N.W.2d 708 (1954). Cf. Davis, The
Law of Surface Water in Missouri, 24 Mo. L. Rlv. 137, 149-50 (1959); Kinyon &
McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. REv. 891, 898-904 (1940);
Maloney & Plager, Diffused Surface Water: Scourge or Bounty? 8 NAT. Rs. J. 72,
78-79 (1968).
41. See, e.g., Peck v. Herrington, 109 Ill. 611 (1884); Fennema v. Menninga,
236 Iowa 543, 19 N.W.2d 689 (1945); Martin v. Riddle, 26 Pa. 415 (1856). Cf.
Davis, supra note 40, at 147-48; Kinyon & McClure, supra note 40, at 893-97;
Maloney & Plager, supra note 40, at 76-77.
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alterations in the drainage pattern onto lower lands, with due regard to
the co-equal right of the lower landowner also to make reasonable uses
of his land. The rights of land use are correlative and interferences with
natural drainage patterns must not be unreasonably injurious to other
landowners.4 2 All three rules are concerned with the relationship between
landowners with respect to drainage of diffused surface water off land.
The rules do not address themselves to retention of diffused surface water
generally, 43 to retention under conditions where flow in a nearby surface
watercourse would be reduced, 44 or to diversion to a different watershed
45
where the flow of a watercourse would be increased.
C. PercolatingGroundwater
For the allocation of groundwater, separate rules have been developed
for so-called "underground streams," 46 to which ordinary riparian or prior
appropriation principles apply,4 7 and for percolating groundwater. There
are three major rules controlling the allocation of percolating groundwater
which are recognized throughout the United States: "absolute ownership,"
"reasonable use," and eastern "correlative rights." In addition, several
western states have either supplemented these doctrines with the California
"correlative rights" or "common pool" doctrine, or have replaced them
with prior appropriation allocation.
1. Absolute Ownership Rule
The "absolute ownership" rule is derived from two propositions: (1)
percolating groundwater spreads in every direction under the land and
42. See, e.g., Klutey v. Department of Highways, 428 S.W.2d 766 (Ky. 1967);

Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 32 N.W.2d 286 (1948); Franklin v. Durgee,

71 N.H. 186, 51 A. 911 (1901); Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120
A.2d 4 (1956). Cf. Davis, supra note 40, at 151-52; Kinyon & McClure, supra note
40, at 904-13; Maloney &.Plager, supra note 40, at 79-81.
43. This problem is discussed in Dolson, Diffused Surface Water and Riparian
Rights: Legal Doctrines in Conflict, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 58, 59-92; Kinyon & McClure,
supra note 40, at 913-25; Maloney 8&Plager, supra note 40, at 107-09.
44. See, e.g., Rawstron v. Taylor, 11 Ex.369, 156 Eng. Rep. 873 (1855); Taylor
v. St. Helens Corp., 6 Ch. D. 264 (1877). But see Oklahoma Water Res. Bd. v.
Central Okla. Master Conservancy Dist., 464 P.2d 748 (Okla. 1968); Rugby Joint
Water Bd. v. Walters, [1967] Ch. 397 (1966). This problem is discussed in Dolson,
supra note 43, at 93-102.
45. This problem is discussed in Maloney & Plager, supra note 40, at 89-92.
46. Several hydrologists have argued that there is no such thing as an underground stream with a defined channel and definite direction except in rare instances. See, e.g., Piper & Thomas, supra note 14, at 10-11; Tolman & Stipp, supra
note 23, at 121-24, 130-32. The correlation between the hydrologic understanding
of groundwater movement and the legal concept of underground streams is an
important matter to be investigated, but is beyond the scope of this article.
47. See, e.g., Hale v. McLea, 53 Cal. 578 (1879); Tampa Waterworks Co. v.
Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 20 So. 780 (1896); Saddler v. Lee, 66 Ga. 45 (1880); Jones
v. Home Bldg. 9- Loan Ass'n, 252 N.C. 626, 114 S.E.2d 638 (1960); Clinchfield
Coal Corp. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 139 S.E. 308 (1927).
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it is impossible for a landowner to know what effect any activity on his
land or any diversion of groundwater will have until after the fact; and
(2) each landowner owns everything lying beneath the surface of his land,
to the center of the earth. Therefore, the landowner may make any use
of percolating groundwater he chooses, including piping it to non-overlying
land or selling it, or may make any use of his land which affects the movement of groundwater, without incurring liability for resulting injury to
his neighbor's percolating groundwater supply.4 8 The rule seems to be
based on the notion that a person should not be held liable for adverse
consequences of his activities if he is not in a position to predict or anticipate
those consequences in advance. Although the doctrine seems to have had
its origin in a concept of essential fairness, the rule has been applied in
situations where a landowner knew perfectly well what the results of his
activity would be; in other words, the rule has been interpreted as creating
a conclusive presumption that a landowner cannot and does not know the
movements of percolating groundwater under his land.
2. Reasonable Use Rule
The "reasonable use" rule is a modification of the "absolute ownership" rule. In essence, it holds a landowner immune from liability only
(1) if he uses percolating groundwater on the land on which the well is
located (the overlying land) and the use is reasonable per se, or (2) if
the use of the land which affects the movement of percolating groundwater
is reasonable per se. In other words, a landowner may not waste percolating
groundwater, maliciously divert it, or sell it for use on non-overlying land
to the injury of his neighbor's groundwater supply. No comparison of his
use of groundwater or land is made with those of his neighbor under this
rule.4 9 The term "reasonable use," therefore, does not mean what it means
in the allocation of water in surface watercourses or of diffused surface
water-a correlative or co-equal right of use in several neighboring landowners. Instead, it creates, as does the "absolute ownership" rule, a right

48. See, e.g., Behrens v. Scharringhausen, 22 Ill. App. 2d 326, 161 N.E.2d
44 (1959); Western Md. R.R. v. Martin, 110 Md. 554, 73 A. 267 (1909); Ganer
v. Town of Milton, 346 Mass. 617, 195 N.E.2d 65 (1964); Frazier v. Brown, 12
Ohio St. 294 (1861); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 A. 627
(1934); Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49 (1856); Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 355, 94
N.W. 354 (1903); Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 824, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex.
1843). See also Ellis, supra note 3, at 21; Thomas; supra note 1.
49. DeBok v. Doak, 188 Iowa 597, 176 N.W. 631 (1920); Associated Constr.
Stone Co. v. Pewee Valley Sanitarium g: Hosp., 876 S.W.2d 316 (Ky. 1963); Chesley
v. King, 74 Me. 164 (1882); Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 251 Md. 428, 248 A.2d
106 (1968); Bayer v. Nello L. Teer Co., 256 N.C. 509, 124 S.E.2d 552 (1962);
Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 839 Pa. 129, 14 A.2d 87 (1940); Wheatley
v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855) (this case is usually cited as an absolute ownership
decision, but a close reading of its language indicates that interpretation is incorrect). See Ellis, supra note 8, at 21; Thomas, supra note 1.
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of capture with the best right, in practice, going to the landowner in the
hydrologically superior location. 50
3. Western "Correlative Rights" Rule
The "correlative rights" rule as it has developed in the eastern states
is quite different from the western rule of the same name. "Correlative
rights" in the eastern decisions means that a comparison of uses of the
conflicting users of percolating groundwater must be made. "Correlative
rights" in western parlance means that when the users over a common
aquifer are "mining" the percolating groundwater-when the aggregate
annual pumpage exceeds the annual natural recharge-all users must cut
back their pumping proportionately according to their allotted rights until
pumping equals recharge. The western doctrine does not allocate groundwater diversion rights as between various users; it requires proportional
reductions in the exercise of those rights acquired under other doctrines
to prevent depletion of the groundwater resource.5 1 The western rule is,
in reality, a "common pool" doctrine similar to that developed for the oil
and gas industry and is a resource conservation concept. It is unfortunate
that the western and eastern doctrines have the same name, since they
have no conceptual relationship. 52
4. Eastern Correlative Rights Rule
The eastern "correlative rights" rule allows each landowner to make
reasonable uses of percolating groundwater on his overlying land and to
make reasonable uses of land that affect the movement of that groundwater. What is a reasonable use is decided by comparing the uses made
by the conflicting users for the purposes of determining liability and of
affording relief. In other words, each landowner's right is a co-equal
usufructuary right and, therefore, correlative.53 It is the only doctrine

50. There is great confusion about the distinction between the "reasonable
use" rule and the eastern "correlative rights" rule. A note in this issue makes
a careful examination of the cases following these two rules and suggests a
clarification. See Thomas, supra note 1. See also Hanks & Hanks, supra note 3,
at 639-42.
51. See, e.g., City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d
17 (1949); Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903); Glover v. Utah
Oil Ref. Co., 62 Utah 174, 218 P. 955 (1923); Horne v. Utah Oil Ref. Co., 59
Utah 279, 202 P. 815 (1921). See also Hanks & Hanks, supra note 3, at 637-39.
52. On this distinction, see F. MALON.Y et al., supra note 36. at 157-58; Hanks
Banks, supra note 3, at 644 n.96; McHendrie, The Law of Underground Water,
H
13 RocKY MT. L. REv. 1, 5-7 (1940). See also Yeo v. Tweedy, 34 N.M. 611, 618-23,
286 P. 970, 973-75 (1929).

53. See, e.g., Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 228 Ark. 76, 306 S.W.2d 111
(1957); MacArtor v. Graylyn Crest III Swim Club, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 26, 187 A.2d
417 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Koch v. Wick, 87 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1956); Higday v. Nickolaus,
469 S.W.2d 859 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971); Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569
(1862). The court in Higday indicated that it was adopting the "reasonable use"
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governing the allocation of percolating groundwater which permits and
requires a comparison of the equities of conflicting uses. In this fundamental characteristic it is identical to the reasonable use doctrines governing surface watercourses and diffused surface water.
All three major percolating groundwater rules followed in the eastern
states, and the California "correlative rights" or "common pool" rule, have
one common characteristic. They all control the relationship between users
of percolating groundwater from a single aquifer or connected aquifers.
They do not address themselves to possible conflicts between a user of
percolating groundwater and a user of a hydrologically related surface
watercourse.
5. Prior Appropriation
The last rule concerning the allocation of percolating groundwater
which must be mentioned is prior appropriation. In many states in the
West, either by case decision or statute, the principles of the prior appropriation doctrine developed for surface watercourses have been applied independently to percolating groundwater in single or connected aquifers.
There are no differences in concept or application, but the hidden nature
of the water source does complicate the problems of proof connected with
proceedings under the doctrine. 54 Although the prior appropriation system
for surface watercourses and percolating groundwater are independent of
each other, when groundwater is proven to be tributary to a stream or to
be part of its subflow or subsurface support, the groundwater will be
administered under the prior appropriation system applicable to the surface stream rather than that applying to neighboring groundwater aquifers.
This is the principal instance where the courts clearly have recognized the
hydrologic connection between percolating groundwater and surface watercourses.
V.

LEGAL RECOGNITION OF THE HYDROLOGIC INTERRELATIONSHIP- BETWEEN
PERCOLATING GROUNDWATER

AND SURFACE WATERCOURSES

Discussions of the legal interrelationship between groundwater and
surface watercourses rarely occur in general discussions of water law. There
have been few articles and discussions in point, except with respect to
rule and rejecting the California "correlative rights" rule. But in reality it was
adopting the eastern "correlative rights" rule, since it compared its rule to the
"reasonable use" rule applicable to surface watercourses. Higday v. Nickolaus,
supra, at 866-67, 869-70. This confusion between label and definition is discussed
at length in a note in this issue. See Thomas, supra note 1.
54. Adoption by case decision: e.g., Justesen v. Olsen, 86 Utah 158, 40 P.2d
802 (1935); Wrathall v. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 P.2d 755 (1935). Adoption by
statute: e.g., Yeo v. Tweedy, 34 N.M. 611, 286 P. 970 (1929); Knight v. Grimes,
80 S.D. 517, 127 N.W.2d 708 (1964). See Clark, Ground Water Legislation in the
Light of Experience in the Western States, 22 MONT. L. Rav. 42 (1960); and
numerous other articles on the groundwater legislation of particular western states.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss2/1
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groundwater tributary to or supportive of surface watercourses governed
by prior appropriation. 55 None of them makes a substantial analysis of
the cases. This part will discuss the eastern and western cases in point.
The author has made an exhaustive search to find every case involving a conflict between groundwater users and surface watercourse users in
the 31 states east of and including the tier along the western bank of the
Mississippi River. In addition, he believes he has found most of these cases
in the 17 western states. 56 Percolating groundwater/surface watercourse
cases are listed in the Appendix. The basic questions to be answered in the
analyses which follow are whether the courts recognize the hydrologic relationship between percolating groundwater and surface watercourses;
whether this recognition, if it occurs, affects the result; and what principles,
if any, the courts apply to this relationship.
A. Analysis of the Cases
With rare exception, the courts in the eastern states have not dealt
formally with the hydrologic relationship between percolating groundwater and surface watercourses. Instead, they have usually made their
decisions by choosing to follow either percolating groundwater rules or surface watercourse rules. The purpose of the following analyses is to determine when the courts choose to follow one set of rules and when to follow
the other. In the western states, the situation is much different. There the
courts usually explicitly follow surface watercourse rules when either
groundwater flow tributary to a stream or subflow or subsurface support
of a stream is involved.
1. Hydrologic Conditions in the Cases
As an introduction to the analyses, it is useful as background to know
what types of cases have been dealt with. The hydrologic conditions existing in the cases are as follows:
Table 1
Hydrologic Conditions Existing in Cases57
I. Influent streams (water leaves stream to groundwater)
A. Diversion from stream lowers groundwater level and yield.
eastern cases:
3
western cases:
2
55. Prior appropriation law is discussed in: Moses, The Correlationof Surface
and Underground Water Rights, 27 OKLA. B.A.J. 2095 (1956); Moses, Basic Groundwater Problems, 14 RocKY MT. MIN. L. INSTIT. 501, 518-22 (1968); Tolman & Stipp,
supra note 23; Wiel, supra note 23. The only discussion of common law principles
is Hanks & Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey: Groundwater, 24 RUTGERS
L. REv. 621, 642-46 (1970).

56. So far as the author is aware, there are no cases from Alaska or Hawaii.
57. See AxPPmwix for case names.
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B. Reduction in reservoir level lowers water table.
eastern cases:
I
western cases:
0
C. Raised reservoir level raises water table.
eastern cases: 11
0
western cases:
D. Pumping or groundwater drainage draws water from stream
and reduces stream flow.
eastern cases:
8
western cases:
8
English cases:
8
E. Stream pollution degrades groundwater.
eastern cases:
1
western cases:
0
II. Effluent streams (water enters stream from groundwater)
A. Pumping or groundwater drainage reduces additions to stream
and reduces its flow.
eastern cases: 16
western cases: 26
English cases:
8
B. Pumping or groundwater drainage lowers water table and
reservoir level.
eastern cases:
2
0
western cases:
C. Raised reservoir level obstructs groundwater drainage and raises
water table.
eastern cases:
4
western cases:
0
D. Diversion from stream draws more flow from groundwater and
reduces well or drainage yield.
eastern cases:
1
western cases:
0
E. Groundwater pollution degrades stream.
eastern cases:
4
western cases:
0
Most cases fall into one of two types: those where groundwater pumping
or diversions have reduced stream flow (69),58 and those where a reservoir
has flooded land by inducing or obstructing percolation (15).59 Only six
cases involved a stream diversion affecting the groundwater supply, 60 only
five involved pollution, 61 and only three involved the lowering of related
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,

categories
categories
categories
categories

I.D. and II.A.
I.C. and lI.C.
l.A. and IH.D.
I.E. and I.E.
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reservoir and water table levels.6 2 The concentration on certain types of
fact situations in the cases may have produced a similar concentration in
the rules followed.
2. Legal Rules Followed in the Gases
The various legal rules followed in the cases are as follows. A comparison of the rules with the hydrologic conditions will be made later.
Table 2
63
Legal Rules Followed in Cases

1. Percolating groundwater rules followed.
a. Absolute ownership.
eastern states-cases:
-jurisdictions:
western states-cases:
-jurisdictions:
English cases:

16
9
2
2
8

b. Reasonable use.
eastern states-cases:
-jurisdictions:
western states-cases:
-jurisdictions:

5
2
1
1

c. Correlative rights.
eastern states-cases:
-jurisdictions:
western states-cases:
-jurisdictions:

3
2
0
0

d. Common pool
(California "correlative rights").
eastern states-cases:
-jurisdictions:
western states-cases:
-jurisdictions:

0
0
1
1

2. Surface watercourse rules followed.
a. Riparian rights.
i. Natural flow doctrine.
eastern states-cases:
-jurisdictions:

10
5

62. Id., categories I.B. and II.B.
63. See APPENDIX for case names.
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western states-cases:
-jurisdictions:
cases:
English

3
1
2

ii. Reasonable use doctrine.
eastern states-cases:
-jurisdictions:
western states-cases:
-jurisdictions:

1
1
3
2

b. Prior appropriation.
eastern states-cases:
-jurisdictions:
western states-cases:
-jurisdictions:

0
0
31
7

3. Other special rules followed.
a. Trespass-flooding compensation.
eastern states-cases:
-jurisdictions:
western states-cases:
-jurisdictions:

8
4
0
0

[Vol. 37

b. Induced underground current.
eastern states-cases:
-jurisdictions:
western states-cases:
-jurisdictions:
English cases:

5
2
0
0
1

eastern states-cases:
-jurisdictions:
states-cases:
western
-jurisdictions:

4
2
0
0

d. Negligence
eastern states-cases:
-jurisdictions:
western states-cases:
-jurisdictions:

1
I
0
0

e. Natural mine drainage
eastern states-cases:
-jurisdictions:
western states-cases:
-jurisdictions:

2
1
0
0

c. Nuisance
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f. Other

eastern states-cases:
-jurisdictions:
western states-cases:
-jurisdictions:
English cases:

2
1
0
0
1

What is immediately apparent from this breakdown of the decisions is
that most of the western cases are decided according to the prior appropriation doctrine applicable to surface watercourses. 64 There are 31 of these
decisions compared to only four decisions decided under some rule pertaining to percolating groundwater. In addition, there were six other cases
decided under one of the other rules pertaining to surface watercourses.
Without going further, this suggests that the western courts do recognize
the hydrologic connection between percolating groundwater and surface
watercourses and treat the groundwater as part of the watercourse when a
stream is affected. By contrast, the eastern cases are more evenly split.
Cases following percolating groundwater rules number 24 (reinforced by
eight English decisions), while only 11 follow surface watercourse rules
(plus two English decisions). This would seem to suggest that the eastern
courts favor the well owner, while the western courts favor the stream user,
but the former conclusion requires further consideration in light of the
18 cases (plus one English case) following various special rules seemingly
recognizing the hydrologic relationship.
3. Legal Rule vs. Hydrologic Condition
The next table indicates the relationship between the legal rule followed and the hydrologic condition existing in each case. Its purpose is
to show the distribution of the large number of cases following prior appropriation and absolute ownership rules. The table makes clear that onehalf the cases are concerned with a single hydrologic problem, the reduction
in stream flow caused by pumping from wells or diverting groundwater
which drains into a stream. One-half of these cases (23) are western and
were decided on the basis of prior appropriation-which gives preference
to the stream diverter in most cases. The other one-half are mostly eastern
cases, 75 percent of which (21) were decided on the basis of the absolute
ownership rule or reasonable use (groundwater) rule-which favors the
well owner. The other large group of cases involved the raising of the
water table by constructing or raising a reservoir, and nearly all (14 out of
16) were decided by rules which would grant compensation to the flooded
landowner.

64. See cases cited Id. categories I.A.2.b., I.D.2.b., and II.A.2.b.
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Table 3
Legal Rule vs. Hydrologic Condition6 5
Effluent
Stream

Influent
Stream

Hydrologic
Condition

Abs. Own.
Reas. Use

2
2

Comm. Pool

1-----------------------------1

Corr. Rts.

2

cu

.

Total

-

1

-

.

.

.-

.

.

2!
2

1--

1

5
2
7

18
3

2

-

1

.

.

21

1

-

6
1
23

.
.

-

30

1

-

1
-

3

1
-

25
6

3

1

1

35

1

.
.

.
.

..-

15
4
31

-

-

1

50

Surf. Watercourse

Nat. Flow
Reas. Use
Prior App.

1
I

Total

3

1

-

-

-

-

Other Special Rules
Trespass

Undergrd. Curt.
Nuisance

.

1

14

7

.

-

..

6

.

I

1

-

8

1I

-----

1

-

-----

.

.

.

.

Negligence
I
1------------------------2
Nat. Mine Drain.---------------------------Other3

Total
GrandATotal

8

1

9

6

1

12

21

1

2

6
4

2

2
3

3

E

1

-

4

25

54

2

4

1

6

110

4. Decisions in the Gases
The distribution of cases shown in the last table suggests that there
may be a tendency toward certain results in various fact situations. Table 4,
following, indicates the relationship between the hydrologic conditions,
whether the plaintiff was a stream or groundwater user, and who won in
each case. At the bottom of the table is summarized the decision reached

65. The figures in this table do not correspond exactly to those in Table 6

because a few cases are counted twice here. They are higher than the corresponding
figures in Tables 4-7 because of the inclusion of dicta.
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and the determination whether the stream user or groundwater user was
the injuring party. Table 5 further summarizes the results of Table 4
by showing the relationship between the hydrologic condition and whether
the stream user or the groundwater user won each case. It also shows the
relationship between who won each case and who was the injuring party.
This information was used to construct Table 6.
It will be noted from Tables 4 and 5 that certain hydrologic conditions
are marked with an asterisk (*). Those are conditions in which the stream
user has used the water in such a way as to injure a neighboring groundTable 4
Hydrologic Condition vs. Decision in Case
Decision in Case

Stream User is
Plaintiff
t!s

c

loses

wins

loses

wins
Hydrologic
Condition

Groundwater User
is Plaintiff
t;

c

.

Influent Stream

*Diversion from
2

stream depletes g.w.
*Reservoir lowers
water table

---

----

*Reservoir raises
water table

---

---

Pumping draws water
from stream

8

6

10-

2

1

1

6

Pumping lowers
reservoir
OReservoir blocks

pollutes stream
Stream User injures
Groundwater User
(entries marked ')
Groundwater User
injures Stream User
(unstarred entries)

-

2
1

---

Effluent Stream
Pumping reduces
stream flow

groundwater

1

-

1

*Stream pollutes
groundwater------

*Diversion from
stream lowers g.w.
Groundwater

1

14

1

7

2

1

-

1

9

2------------

--

---

---

-1

1
2

2

1-

18 20

--

14

-

3

9

8

1

82
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water user. The unmarked hydrologic conditions involve the reverse situation-where the groundwater user has done something which has injured
a stream user. Tables 6 and 7 reanalyze the cases according to these two
groups of hydrologic conditions. Table 6 indicates the relationship between
the determination whether the stream or groundwater user wins in each
of those two groups of hydrologic conditions, and the rule followed in
making that determination. Table 7 summarizes the analysis of Table 6
by indicating both whether the stream user or groundwater user is the
preferred user under each rule and whether the injuring or injured party
is the preferred party under each rule. That is the information which
answers the question: is there a trend in the cases recognizing or refusing
Table 5
Hydrologic Condition vs. Decision in Case-Summary
Decision in Case

Stream User Wins

Hydrologic
Condition

,.B0

Groundwater User

Wins
r.

-

Influent Stream
*Diversion from
1

stream depletes g.w.

1

2

-

1

-

*Reservoir lowers
1-

water table

-

-

-

-

*Reservoir raises
2

water table

-

10

-

Pumping draws water
from stream

8

6

2

-

2

1

*Stream pollutes
groundwater

Effluent Stream
Pumping reduces
stream flow
Pumping lowers
reservoir

I

-

6

23

2

-

-

3

-

-

-

1

-

-

-

-

7

3

7

-

-

I

-

-

-

1

-

-

-

2

-

-

-

14

1

9

5

-

*Reservoir blocks
groundwater

ODiversion from
stream lowers g.w.

-

Groundwater
2

pollutes stream

Stream User injures
GroundwaterUser
(entries marked

8

1

18

29

-

)

Groundwater User
injures Stream User
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to recognize the hydrologic connection between percolating groundwater
and surface watercourses? 66
Table 6
Legal Rule vs. Decision in Case
Stream User injures
Groundwater User
Stream
Groundwater
User wins
User wins

Legal Rule

Groundwater User
injures Stream User
Groundwater
Stream
User wins
Userwin

Ab

Groundwater
Abs. Own.
Reas. Use
Corr. Rts.
Comm. Pool

4
1

Total
Surface Watercourse
Nat. Flow
Reas. Use
Prior App.
Total
Other Special Rule
Trespass
Undergrd. Curr.
Nuisance
Negligence
Nat. Mine Drain.-Other
Total
Grand Total

--

5

-

1
2

1
--

3

1-

2

---

-

-

-

1 -

--1--

7

8

1--

-

-

1

--

2

1

8

-

--

-

5 2--

1-

-

4 -

6
1

3
2
1 26 -

7

302

-

5 -

7--

----

1
1

---

6-2--

-

1
-1--2---

----

2 -1
3-8

9
1

-

14

2 -

2

--

9

5

8

10 -

1

18

3

30

a. Western Cases
It is dear at once from Tables 6 and 7 that the law of the western
states recognizes the hydrologic connection between percolating groundwater
and surface watercourses. The tables indicate that most of the western
cases involve a groundwater user affecting water use by a stream user
66. A simple analysis of determining whether the plaintiff is a stream user
or groundwater user and whether he won or lost does not give as good results.
The reason is that there are several cases where the plaintiff is the injuring party
and is seeking to quiet title. The decisions in those cases would fall in with the
cases where the plaintiff is the injured party, when they should be added with
the decisions where the defendant is the injuring party. The analysis in Tables
6 and 7 accomplishes this result.
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Table 7
Legal Rule vs. Decision in Case-Summary
Preferred Party
Iniuring
Injured
Party
Party

Preferred User
Stream
Groundwater
User
User

Legal Rule

Q

Groundwater
Abs. Own.
Reas. Use
Corr. Rts.
Comm. Pool
Total

r.

C3~
3

9
2
I

-

12

-

4
1
1 ----

5 3 I2

8

6

0

8

--

1

tI

8
--

2 1 2--

8

4

1 -

8

3

1

226-

Surface Watercourse
Nat. Flow

6

Reas. Use
PriorApp.

1

Total
Other Special Rule
Trespass
Undergrd. Curr.
Nuisance
Negligence

-

3

2

1 27 -

7 31

2

2--

-

-2-

4 -

2

6 -

-

1
5 -

6

1
1

Other

1
7
6---------------38
1
1
1
--2
2 -

Total

13 -

1

11--

5

-

26 31

3

23

17

6

Nat. Mine Drain.

Grand Total

-

1

9 31

2

2

7-66-381-

2---

2 -

7

8

8

19 -

1

32 32

3

(35 cases). Of these, 30 were decided under the prior appropriation doctrine,
3 under the natural flow doctrine of riparian rights and 2 under the reasonable use doctrine of riparian rights. Of the total of 35 cases, 30 were decided
in favor of the injured stream user,67 and only 5 in favor of the injuring
groundwater user.08 Table 3 indicates that all of the 30 prior appropria67. In favor of the injured stream user:
1. Prior appropriation: See all cases cited in APPENDix, categories I.D.2.b.
and Il.A.2.b., except as listed below.
2. Natural flow: City of Los Angeles v. Hunter, 156 Cal. 603, 105 P. 755
(1909); Verdugo Canon Water Co. v. Verdugo, 152 Cal. 655, 93 P. 1021
(1908); McClintock v. Hudson, 141 Cal. 275, 74 P. 849 (1903).
3. Reasonable use: Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 45 P.2d 972 (1935).
68. In favor of injuring groundwater user:
1. Prior appropriation: Fellhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 820, 447 P.2d
986 (1968); Leonard v. Shatzer, 11 Mont. 422, 28 P. 457 (1892); Little
Cottonwood Water Co. v. Sandy City, 123 Utah 242, 258 P.2d 440 (1953);
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tion decisiofis involved groundwater pumping which depleted stream
flow (23 under effluent stream conditions, 7 under influent stream conditions). Although it is clear that the western cases recognize the hydrologic
connection and apply surface watercourse law to tributary and supporting
percolating groundwater,6 9 there are very few cases deciding whether the
hydrologic connection should be recognized when a stream user injures
a groundwater user-for example, by pumping water from an influent
stream. Both western cases recognize the connection, although one gives
relief to the groundwater user 7O and the other does not.71 The strong
authority recognizing the hydrologic connection in the effluent stream
cases favors the stream diverter. This would be the usual result in the west
because the waters in streams usually were appropriated before irrigators
turned to groundwater supplies. There would not be many situations where
the groundwater diversion right would predate the stream diversion right.
The same circumstances should favor the stream user in the influent stream
situation under prior appropriation law. In the one case in point, he is
favored. 72 But what if the circumstances are not usual and the groundwater use is prior in time, or the stream diversion takes place under
riparian law rather than prior appropriation law in a dual doctrine state
such as California? In the one case in point, the hydrologic connection is
recognized. The court treated the groundwater percolating out of and
parallel to the stream as part of a continuum to which correlative rights
and duties attach. 73 The five cases which favor the groundwater diverter
in the effluent stream situation, contrary to the expected result, are not
decided on the basis of refusing to recognize the hydrologic connection as
a matter of law.7 4 In each, the stream user was unable to prove that the
diverted groundwater was tributary to or supportive of the stream flow.
Therefore, every western case which the author has found involving a
relationship between percolating groundwater and surface watercourses has
Mountain Lake Mining Co. v. Midway Irrigation Co., 47 Utah 346, 149
P. 929 (1915) (query).

2. Reasonable use: Metropolitan Util. Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co., 179
Neb. 783, 140 N.W.2d 626 (1966).
69. See discussion of the doctrine supporting this view in text accompanying
notes 108-20 infra.
70. This case is listed in Tables 6 and 7 as two cases. Miller v. Bay Cities
Water Co., 157 Cal. 256, 107 P. 115 (1910), found for the groundwater user in
the alternative under the reasonable use rule for percolating groundwater or
the reasonable use doctrine of riparian rights. The court found that the groundwater user was prior in time and that he depended on percolating flow derived
from a nearby river.
71. Maricopa County Municipal Water Conserv. Dist. No. 1 v. Southwest
Cotton Co., 39 Ariz. 65, 4 P.2d 869 (1931), found for the stream user under the
prior appropriation doctrine because he was entitled to divert stream water under
his antecedent diversion right even though it depleted the supply of water percolating from the stream to a well.

72. See note 71 supra.
73. See Miller v. Bay Cities Water Co., 157 Cal. 256, 107. P. 115 (1910).
74. See cases cited note 68 supra.
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recognized the hydrologic connection as a matter of law. None of them
insists upon maintaining the fiction that percolating groundwater and
surface watercourses are independent unrelated sources of water.
b." Eastern Cases
The cases in the eastern states are not definitive and uniform in result,
In terms of raw figures, the stream user was favored in about one-half the
cases (26 to 23), compared with an overwhelming preference for the stream
user in the western states (31 cases to 7). However, in the eastern states
a large majority of decisions did favor the injured party (32 to 17), and
recognized the hydrologic connection between percolating groundwater and
surface watercourses. By contrast, the injured party was overwhelmingly
favored in the western cases (32 to 6). But an examination of the doctrines
followed and the hydrologic conditions existing in the cases shows great
variation in result. More probing analysis of the cases is needed.
Most of the eastern cases involve two types of situations: (1) groundwater pumping reduces stream flow or lowers reservoir level; and (2) raising the level of a reservoir raises the water table. There are 23 cases of
the first type 75 and 16 of the second type. 76 Eleven of the 16 reservoir
heightening cases favored the injured landowner or groundwater user who
was subjected to a raised water table and soggy ground. However, 7 of
those 11 decisions were based on a trespass theory. 77 An eighth trespass decision found for the stream user because the causal connection between
the reservoir and the soggy ground was not established.78 The remaining
75. The breakdown of the groundwater pumping cases is as follows:
Influent stream:
Pumping draws water from stream
8
Effluent stream:
13
Pumping reduces stream flow
Pumping lowers reservoir
2
Total
23
All of the English cases fall into this category. There are 11 such cases. See Table
5 supra.

76. The breakdown of the reservoir heightening cases is as follows:
Influent stream:

Reservoir raises water table
12
Effluent stream:
Reservoir blocks groundwater
4
Total
16
There are no English cases of this type. See Table 5 supra.
77. Belkus v. City of Brockton, 282 Mass. 285, 184 N.E. 812 (1933); Wilson v.
City of New Bedford, 108 Mass. 261 (1871); Fuller v. Chicopee Mfg. Co., 82
Mass. (16 Gray) 46 (1860); Monson & Brimfield Mfg. Co. v. Fuller, 32 Mass.
(15 Pick.) 554 (1834); Robb v. State, 174 Misc. 180, 20 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Ct. Cl. 1940);
Odell v. Nyack Waterworks Co., 91 Hun 283, 36 N.Y.S. 206 (Sup. Ct. 1895);
Barberton v. Miksch, 12 Ohio L. Abs. 245 (Ct. App. 1932), aff'd, 128 Ohio St.
169, 190 N.E. 387 (1934).
78. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Van Dobson, 14 Tenn. App. 54 (1932).
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eight cases, four of which were decided in favor of the injured landowner
or groundwater user, were decided under a number of different doctrines.
Decisions favoring the injured party were decided as follows:
279
Correlative rights rule of groundwater
180
Natural flow doctrine of riparian rights
181
Nuisance
Decisions favoring the injuring reservoir owner were decided as follows:
282
Absolute ownership rule of groundwater
3
18
Correlative rights rule of groundwater
4
18
Negligence
Since two of the four cases favoring the reservoir owner were based on the
absence of facts establishing liability even though the hydrologic connection was recognized,8 5 only the two absolute ownership decisions can be
said to involve a refusal by the courts to recognize the hydrologic connection involved in the reservoir heightening situation as a matter of law.
Therefore, it is evident that the courts have been willing to impose liability
for the injurious heightening of the water table because of raising the level
of a reservoir in most cases (14 out of 16), and will be willing to do so in
the future under appropriate cirmumstances. However, the opposite result
seems likely in states still following the absolute ownership doctrine.
The groundwater pumping cases are more evenly divided. A total
of sixteen eastern cases have favored the injured stream user while only
seven have favored the injuring groundwater user. The sixteen cases favoring the injured stream user were decided as follows:
18 6
Reasonable use rule of groundwater
Natural flow doctrine of riparian rights
687
79. Cason v. Florida Power Co., 74 Fla. 1, 76 So. 535 (1917); Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862). See also note 83 infra (the case discussed
therein supports the legal position taken here).
80. Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520 (1866).
81. Welliver v. Irondale Elec. Light, Heat & Power Co., 38 Pa. Super. 26
(1909).
82. White River Chair Co. v. Connecticut River Power Co., 105 Vt. 24,
162 A. 859 (1932); Harwood v. Benton &Jones, 32 Vt. 724 (1860).
83. Moore v. Berlin Mills Co., 74 N.H. 305, 67 A. 578 (1907). The use by
the reservoir owner was found to be reasonable with respect to the use of the
land by the injured owner. Hence, this case supports the other correlative rights
cases recognizing the hydrologic connection between the raised reservoir and
the wet ground. See cases cited note 79 supra.
84. Mowday v. Moore, 133 Pa. 598, 19 A. 626 (1890). The reservoir owner
was found to be non-negligent here.
85. See cases cited notes 83-84 supra.
86. Stevens v. Spring Valley Water Works & Supply Co., 42 Misc. 2d 86,
247 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
87. Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 234 A.2d 825 (1967);
Harper Hollingsworth & Darby Co. v. Mountain Water Co., 65 N.J.Eq. 479, 56
A. 297 (Ch. 1903); Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 32 App. Div. 257, 52 N.Y.S. 983
(1898), afrd, 160 N.Y. 357, 54 N.E. 787 (1899); Covert v. City of Brooklyn, 6 App.
Div. 73, 39 N.Y.S. 744 (1896); Covert v. Valentine, 66 Hun 32, 21 N.Y.S. 219
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188
689
290

The seven cases favoring the injuring groundwater user were decided as
follows:
591
Absolute ownership rule of groundwater
292
groundwater
of
rule
use
Reasonable
It is clear from these breakdowns that the choice of rule affects the result.
If a surface watercourse rule is applied-which requires recognition of the
hydrologic connection between percolating groundwater and surface
streams-the injured stream user will be favored in the groundwater diversion situation. However, if the English absolute ownership rule is followed,
impliedly the hydrologic connection must be denied as a matter of law,
and the injuring groundwater user will be favored.93 The criteria the

(Sup. Ct. 1892), rev'd on other grounds, 141 N.Y. 521, 36 N.E. 597 (1894); Warder
& Barnett v. Springfield, 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 855 (C.P. 1887). Cf. Merrick Water
Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 82 App. Div. 454, 53 N.Y.S. 10 (1898) (dictum).
88. Fire Dist. No. I v. Graniteville Spring Water Co., 103 Vt. 89, 152 A. 42

(1980).
89. Hollingsworth & Vose Co.,v. Foxborough Water-Supply Co., 165 Mass.
186, 42 N.E. 574 (1896); Proprietors of Mills v. Braintree Water Supply Co., 149
Mass. 478, 21 N.E. 761 (1889); Aetna Mills v. Brookline, 127 Mass. 69 (1879);
Aetna Mills v. Waltham, 126 Mass. 422 (1879); Van Wycklen v. City of Brooklyn,
118 N.Y. 424, 24 N.E. 179 (1890); Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 18 App. Div. 340,
46 N.Y.S. 141 (1897). Query: Were the following natural flow cases impliedly
decided under the induced underground current theory? Collens v. New Canaan
Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 284 A.2d 825 (1967); Harper Hollingsworth & Darby
Co. v. Mountain Water Co., 65 N.J.Eq. 479, 56 A. 297 (Ch. 1903); Smith v. City
of Brooklyn, 32 App. Div. 257, 52 N.Y.S. 933 (1898), afl'd, 160 N.Y. 857, 54 N.E.
787 (1899); Warder & Barnett v. Springfield, 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 855 (C.P. 1887).
90. In excess of stautory authority: Spaulding v. Plainville, 218 Mass. 321,
105 N.E. 1006 (1914); Hart v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., 133 Mass. 488
(1882). The courts make dear (in dicta) in both cases that had the water companies had appropriate powers to use groundwater, no relief would have been
afforded to the injured stream users for reduction in stream flow. Hence, these
two cases support the absolute ownership cases cited note 91 infra.
91. Hartford Rayon Corp. v. Cromwell Water. Co., 126 Conn. 194, 10 A.2d
587 (1940); Stoner v. Patten, 124 Ga. 754, 52 S.E. 894 (1906) (interlocutory appeal),
132 Ga. 178, 63 S.E. 897 (1909); Nourse v. Andrews, 200 Ky. 467, 255 S.W. 84
(1923); Chelsea Dye House 2, Laundry Co. v. Commonwealth, 164 Mass. 350, 41
N.E. 649 (1895); Ellis v. Duncan, 21 Barb. 280 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855).
92. Friedland v. State, 35 App. Div. 2d 755, 814 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1970); Merrick
Water Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 32 App. Div. 454, 53 N.Y.S. 10 (1898) (followed
the reasonable use rule only because the casual connection between the stream's
drying up and the groundwater diversion was not established).
98. That is the result under the great majority of English cases. Eight of
all English decisions involving groundwater diversion of flow otherwise reaching
a surface watercourse were decided in favor of the injuring groundwater user
under the absolute ownership rule. English v. Metropolitan Water Bd., [1907]
1 K.B. 588; Chasemore v. Richards, 2 H. & N. 168, 157 Eng. Rep. 71 (Ex. 1857),
aff'd, 7 H.L. Cas. 349, 11 Eng. Rep. 140 (1859); Broadbent v. Ramsbotham, 11
Ex. 602, 156 Eng. Rep. 971 (1856); Rugby Joint Water Bd. v. Walters, [1967]
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courts use for choosing which rule they will follow will be discussed in the
next section. 94
Fifteen of the 23 groundwater diversion cases were decided under the
rules just discussed and involve the basic choice of rule problem. The
remaining eight cases were decided in favor of the injured stream user
under doctrines of limited applicability. Six were decided under a doctrine
which imposes liability for the consequences of creating a very large cone
of depression by high capacity pumps. This is the import of the language
of those six cases. 95 In addition, each of the cases involved transporting
the diverted groundwater for use on non-overlying land. All of the high
capacity pumping cases the author has found, including those concerning
conflicting groundwater users, 96 involve this factual element. It is probably
Ch. 397 (1966); Bleachers' Ass'n Ltd. v. Chapel-en-le-Frith Rural Dist. Council,
[1933] Ch. 356 (1932); Bradford Corp. v. Ferrand, [1902] 2 Ch. 655.
However, two cases held for the injured stream user under the natural flow
doctrine of riparian rights. Both cases involved a statutory right to divert water
for a navigation canal and this may have affected the decisions, although it was
not mentioned in either as a basis for decision. Dickinson v. Grand Junction Canal
Co., 7 Ex. 282, 155 Eng. Rep. 953 (1852); Grand Junction Canal Co. v. Shugar,
L.R. 6 Ch. 483 (CA. 1871). One case held for the injured stream user under the
absolete prescription theory based on long use. Balston v. Bensted, 1 Camp.
463, 170 Eng. Rep. 1022 (N.P. 1808). This theory was expressly disapproved in
Chasemore v. Richards, supra.
One of the absolute ownership cases suggested in dictum that if an induced
underground current could be proven, the injured stream user would be protected. English v. Metropolitan Water Bd., supra at 701-02.
94. See text accompanying notes 121-39 supra.
95. See cases cited note 89 supra.
96. See, e.g., Bernard v. City of St. Louis, 220 Mich. 159, 189 N.W. 891
(1922) (decided under the reasonable use rule of groundwater); Schenk v. City
of Ann Arbor, 196 Mich. 75, 163 N.W. 109 (1917) (same); Erickson v. Crookston
Waterworks, Power Sc Light Co., 100 Minn. 481, 111 N.W. 391 (1907) (remand-

ing; decided under the reasonable use rule of groundwater), 105 Minn. 182, 117
N.W. 435 (1908) (decided under the correlative rights rule); Meeker v. City of
East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 623, 74 A. 379 (Ct. Err. & App. 1909) (decided under the

reasonable use rule of groundwater); Hathom v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 194
N.Y. 326, 87 N.E. 504 (1909) (decided under the reasonable use rule of groundwater, but high capacity pumping for use on non-overlying land emphasized);
Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522, 58 N.E. 644 (1900) (induced underground current exception to absolute ownership rule); Willis v. City of New York,
69 Misc. 510, 127 N.Y.S. 699 (Sup. Ct. 1910) (same); Hathorn v. Dr. Strong's
Saratoga Springs Sanitarium, 55 Misc. 445, 106 N.Y.S. 553 (Sup. Ct. 1907) (same);
Westphel v. City of New York, 34 Misc. 684, 70 N.Y.S. 1021 (Sup. Ct. 1901), afrd,
177 N.Y. 140, 69 N.E. 369 (1904) (same); Rouse v. City of Kinston, 188 N.C. 1,
123 S.E. 482 (1924) (decided under the reasonable use rule of groundwater); Hatfield Township v. Lansdale Municipal Authority, 403 Pa. 113, 168 A.2d 333 (1961)
(same); Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 14 A.2d 87 (1940)
(same); Stone v. Providence Gas &cWater Co., 13 Pa. Dist. 557 (Dist. Ct. 1904)
(same). Contra, e.g., Crane v. Borough of Essex Fells, 67 N.J. Super. 83, 169 A.2d
845 (Sup. Ct. 1961), affd, 36 N.J. 544, 178 A.2d 196 (1962) (decided upon comparative convenience grounds); Menne v. City of Fond du Lac, 273 Wis. 341,
77 N.W. 2d 703 (1956) (decided under absolute ownership rule). Another case,
whose ratio decidendi was subsequently overruled, also held contra: Ocean Grove
Camp-Meeting Ass'n v. Asbury Park, 40 N.J.Eq. 447, 3 A. 168 (Ch. 1885) (decided
under absolute ownership rule, which was discarded by Meeker v. City of East
Orange, supra).
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a prerequisite to the imposition of the rule. The other two cases were
decided on grounds extraneous to groundwater allocation law.9 7 If the
eight cases turning upon doctrines of limited applicability are removed
from the computation, the eastern courts are nearly evenly divided on
whether to favor the injured stream user or the injuring groundwater user
in the groundwater diversion situation (nine to six in favor of the injured
stream user). The choice of rule becomes extremely significant.
There remain the cases where a stream diversion affects the groundwater supply, and the pollution cases. There are five stream diversion cases
in the eastern states. The decisions are evenly split, the injured groundwater
user being favored three to two. In the two decisions favoring the injuring
stream user, the groundwater user was denied relief under the absolute
ownership rule of groundwater.9 8 Three decisions favored the injured
groundwater user. One apparently was based on the natural flow doctrine
of riparian rights. This case expressly recognized the hydrologic connection
between the surface watercourse and the groundwater percolating from it,
and extended surface watercourse rules to the groundwater. 99 The second
decision was based on negligence, but said in dictum that in the absence
of negligence the absolute ownership rule would be followed. 100 The
remaining case is anomolous. The Springfield Waterworks case discussed
at the beginning of this article ostensibly is based on the reasonable use
rule of groundwater. Nonetheless, it grants relief to the diverter of groundwater who was selling the water for use on non-overlying land. Under the
doctrine adopted in the case, the groundwater diverter should not be
entitled to relief. However, a large element of malicious interference with
the groundwater supply was involved and apparently was determinative
of the decision. 101 Since two of the three decisions favoring the injured
groundwater user were based on special circumstances, it seems likely that
in the usual situation, at least in absolute ownership states, the injured
groundwater user would not be entitled to relief for injury to his groundwater supply caused by a diversion of stream water. The courts in the
absolute ownership states are likely to treat the groundwater user identically
whether his water supply its injured by a neighboring groundwater diversion or a neighboring stream diversion; he is entitled to capture and use
only that precolating groundwater which happens to reach his property.
Nonetheless there is the indication that the courts, if they were to take
a more hydrologically sound position, might grant relief under one of
the surface watercourse rules as they have done in some cases where a
97. See note 90 supra.
98. In re Miami Conservancy Dist., 25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 325 (C.P. 1924);
Heninger v. McGinnis, 131 Va. 70, 108 S.E. 671 (1921). See Gamer v. Town of
Milton, 346 Mass. 617, 195 N.E. 2d 65 (1964) (dictum).
99. Craig v. Shippensburg Borough, 7 Pa. Super. 526 (1898).
100. Gamer v. Town of Milton, 346 Mass. 617, 195 N.E.2d 65 (1964).
101. Springfield Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74 (St. L. Ct. App.
1895). See discussion in text accompanying notes 5-11 supra.
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groundwater diversion adversely affected a surface watercourse. Again, the
crucial question is the choice of rule.
The pollution cases fall into two categories: where polluted stream
water percolates into and degrades the quality of groundwater; and where
polluted groundwater percolates into and degrades the quality of stream
water. Two cases grant relief and three do not. Both cases granting relief
are based on nuisance doctrine, and were decided in Pennsylvania. 102 They
constitute a recognized limitation on the mine drainage rule postulated
by two of the three decisions which deny relief.' 03 That limitation-that
the general rule allowing acid mine wastes to be drained without liabilityl 04
is followed only if the drainage occurs under the force of gravity and
unaided by mechanical devices and if the use of the land is a natural oneis well recognized in Pennsylvania law. 105 The remaining case, the only
non-Pennsylvania case in the group, is the Haynor decision discussed at
the beginning of this article. Like the Pennsylvania cases favoring the
injured party, it follows nuisance doctrine. But it denied relief and required
a new trial because it was not clear that the well from which the injured
groundwater user took his water was on his own land. 0 6 But it is clear
that the case should be classified as one which recognizes the hydrologic
connection in the pollution situation. This leaves only the two Pennsylvania decisions, and they have been limited by later decisions and they
follow a rule which has been thoroughly discredited in other jurisdictions. 107
102. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126 A. 386 (1924)
(public nuisance); Rarick v. Smith, 17 Pa. County Ct. 627 (1896) (private nuisance).
103. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886); Moun-

tain Water Supply Co. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 3 Pa. D. &cC. 187 (C.P. 1922).
104. See cases cited note 103 supra; Eidemiller v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co.,
15 Pa. D. & C. 759 (C.P. 1930); DiGiacinto v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 27 Leh. L.J.
307 (Pa. C.P. 1957).
105. See cases cited note 103 supra; DiGiacinto v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 26 Leh.
L.J. 247 (Pa. C.P. 1955).
106. Haynor v. Excelsior Springs Light, Power, Heat & Water Co., 129 Mo.
App. 691, 108 S.W. 580 (K.C. Ct. App. 1908). See discussion in text accompanying
notes 12-13 supra.
107. The following cases have expressly criticized Sanderson: Drake v. Lady
Ensley Coal, Iron &cRy., 102 Ala. 501, 507, 14 So. 749, 751 (1894); Bunker Hill
&cSullivan Mining &cConcent. Co. v. Polak, 7 F.2d 583, 585 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
269 U.S. 581 (1925) (decided under Cal. law); Niagara Oil Co. v. Ogle, 177 Ind.
292, 296, 98 N.E. 60, 62 (1912); Parker v. American Woolen Co., 195 Mass. 591,
602-03, 81 N.E. 468, 470-71 (1907); Beach v. Sterling Iron & Zinc Co., 54 N.J.Eq.
65, 73, 33 A. 286, 288 (Ch. 1895), aff'd sub nom. Sterling Iron &:Zinc Co. v. Sparks
Mfg. Co., 55 N.J.Eq. 824, 38 A. 426 (Ct. Err. Sc App. 1897); Strobel v. Kerr Salt
Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 319, 58 N.E. 142, 146-47 (1900); Straight v. Hover, 79 Ohio St.
263, 277, 87 N.E. 174, 175-76 (1909); H. B. Bowling Coal Co. v. Ruffner, 117
Tenn. 180, 196, 100 S.W. 116, 120-22 (1907); Teel v. Rio Bravo Oil Co., 47 Tex.
Civ. App. 153, 161, 104 S.W. 420, 423-24 (1st Dist. 1907); Panther Coal Co. v.
Looney, 185 Va. 758, 764, 40 S.E.2d 298, 300-01 (1946); Arminius Chem. Co. v.
Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 14, 73 S.E. 459, 463-65 (1912); State v. Southern Coal Sc
Transp. Co., 71 W. Va. 470, 475, 76 S.E. 970, 972 (1912); John Young S. Co. v.
Bankier Distillery Co., [1893] A.C. 691, 701-03. See also the critique in 2 H. FARNHAM, LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 518b (1904).
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Hence, it appears that the courts are as willing to recognize the hydrologic
connection between percolating groundwater and surface watercourses
and grant relief where appropriate in the pollution situation as they are
in the reservoir heightening situation. The choice of rule problem arises
principally in flow diversion situations.
B. Choice of Rule
1. Recognition of the Hydrologic Connection in the West
In the western states, the courts always recognize the hydrologic connection between percolating groundwater and surface watercourses when
it exists.' 08 The cases in several western states hold that when percolating
groundwater is tributary to, supportive of, or part of the subflow of a
surface watercourse, surface watercourse rules are applied to that percolating groundwater. In the usual situation, where the stream user has made
a diversion prior in time to a diversion by a groundwater user, and prior
appropriation rules are applicable, the stream user is preferred.
a. Subflow
Twelve cases hold that percolating groundwater which is supportive
of or part of the subflow of a surface watercourse must be treated as part
of the water in the watercourse. 09 The rationale for this view was put
forth expansively in Miller v. Bay Cities Water Co.,110 a California case

which applied the reasonable use doctrine of riparian rights to subflow.
Defendant proposed to divert the flow of a river to a public water supply
system outside the watershed of the river. Plaintiff feared that the flow
percolating from the river to his orchards would dry up and no longer
be available to his irrigation pumps. Finding that both the reasonable
use doctrine of riparian rights and the reasonable use rule of groundwater
would not permit respective diversions outside the watershed and off
overlying land, the court said:
This being so, we perceive no reason why the same rule should not
be applied as between owners of land overlying a substratum
108. See discussion in text accompanying notes 67-74.

109. Maricopa County Municipal Water Conserv. Dist. No. 1 v. Southwest

Cotton Co., 39 Ariz. 65, 4 P.2d 369 (1931); Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. LindsayStrathmore Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 45 P.2d 972 (1935); Miller v. Bay Cities
Water Co., 157 Cal. 256, 107 P. 115 (1910); City of Los Angeles v. Hunter, 156

Cal. 603, 105 P. 755 (1909); Verdugo Canon Water Co. v. Verdugo, 152 Cal. 655,
93 P. 1021 (1908); Montecito Valley Water Co. v. City of Santa Barbara, 144 Cal.
578, 77 P. 1113 (1904); City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 57 P. 585
(1899); Lemm v. Rutherford, 76 Cal. App. 455, 245 P. 225 (Dist. Ct. App. 1926);
City of Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961); Metropolitan Util. Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 140 N.W.2d 626 (1966);
Carlsbad Irrigation Dist. v. Ford, 46 N.M. 335, 128 P.2d 1047 (1942); Howcroft
v. Union 8- Jordan Irrigation Co., 25 Utah 311, 71 P. 487 (1903).
110. 157 Cal. 256, 107 P. 115 (1910).
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of water directly connected with either the surface or subsurface
flow of the stream, and deriving practically its exclusive supply
from that source. The theory upon which the right of a riparian
owner to be protected in the use of the waters of a stream to which
his lands are riparian is that, nature having given these lands the
benefit of the flow, and the natural advantage of its use on the
lands, one riparian owner may not divert these waters to lands
not riparian, to the injury of another riparian owner who can use
them. As far as the owner of lands overlying a gravel stratum is
concerned, it makes no difference in his rights, as against an
appropriator of the water, from what source the supply of water
comes which directly supplies his water-bearing stratum-whether
from a stream or a saturated plane or other body of water which
by natural flow or percolation, either surface or subterranean,
dearly supplies his underground stratum. It would present an
anomalous condition of the law were it the rule that while a
riparian owner may prevent an appropriator from diverting to
his injury the waters of the stream for use beyond the watershed,
and one owner of land overlying a common stratum of percolating
water may restrain another owner similarly situated from making
a like diversion, the owner of land whose underlying stratum
of water is directly and clearly supplied by percolation from the
waters of the stream, and who will be greatly injured by a diversion, is not entitled to prevent it. There is no reason or any difference in the rule between the classes and none should exist. 1 '
Miller was decided on the rationale that if a person cannot divert water
away from the watershed or overlying land because of injury to other users
of the same class of water, then he should not be permitted to do so when
the injury is to a user of a different class of water. The recognition of
the hydrologic connection between classes of water is basic to the decision.
The objection to diversion of water outside the watershed or off the
overlying land does not exist in prior appropriation jurisdictions; that
doctrine permits such diversions. Nonetheless, Miller has been cited in
many prior appropriation decisions holding that subflow is to be regarded
as part of the surface watercourse. It is the recognition of the hydrologic
connection between them that appeals to these courts. Among them is
the Arizona court which handed down Maricopa County Municipal Water
Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. Southwest Cotton Co. Defendant was diverting river flow under a claim of prior appropriation which plaintiff asserted
was defective. Plaintiff was diverting groundwater which he claimed was
subflow of the river. He asserted that this diversion constituted a diversion
of river water prior in time to defendant's and was entitled to injunctive
protection. Before determining which party had the prior claim, the court
found that plaintiff had a cause of action because the subflow was part
of the river:
111. Id. at 278-80. 107 P. at 124-25.
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The underflow, subflow, or undercurrent,... of a surface stream
may be defined as those waters which slowly find their way through
the sand and gravel constituting the bed of the stream, or the lands
under or immediately adjacent to the stream, and are themselves
a part of the surface stream....
As the names given to this class of waters indicate, physically
they constitute a part of the surface stream itself, and are simply
incidental thereto, and also in the main depend on the surface
streams to which they are incident for the greater part of their
water supply....
If the bed of a stream is not solid rock, but gravel or earth, water
will always be found many feet beneath its surface, and there may
and probably will be corresponding to the flow on the surface a
current beneath it. Not only does it move along the course of the
river, but it percolates from its banks from side to side, and the
more abuandant the surface water the further will it reach in its
percolations on each side. But, considered as strictly a part of the
stream, the test is always the same: Does drawing off the subsurface
water tend to diminish appreciably and directly the flow of the
surface stream? If it does, it is subflow, and subject to the same
rules of appropriation as the surface stream itself; if it does not,
then, although it may originally come from the waters of such
stream, it is not, strictly speaking, a part thereof, but is subject
112
to the rules applying to percolating waters.
Although the accuracy of the description of the hydrologic condition has
1 3
been criticized, the test appears to be a good one. "
112. Maricopa County Municipal Water Conserv. Dist. No. 1 v. Southwest
Cotton Co., 39 Ariz. 65, 96-97, 4 P.2d 369, 380-81 (1931).
113. Tolman &cStipp, Analysis of Legal Concepts of Subflow and Percolating
Water, 21 ORE. L. REv.113, 133 (1942). They state:
The waters of subflow are specifically qualified as being "a part of the
surface stream." Effluent subflow or influent subflow, with ground-water
mound in contact with surface flow, comply with this qualification.
Obviously, effluent subflow, which is feeding the stream, may be considered to constitute a part of surface flow. An effluent ground-water
body "supports" the surface stream, in that it contributes to surface flow.
A ground-water mound built up to surface stream level also might be
considered a part of the surface stream, in so far as it is in contact with
surface flow. A well that taps such a mound may abstract water directly
from surface flow. However, where an influent seepage column occurs
between surface flow and the water table, it is evident that subflow cannot
be considered a part of the surface stream. In any case it cannot be said
that a ground-water mound "supports" the surface stream, either in the
sense that it furnishes a physical support or that it contributes to the
supply of surface flow. On the contrary, the surface stream supplies all
of the water of the mound.
The authors consider effluent flow into a stream to be subflow. That type
of flow is what the courts generally refer to as "tributary flow," which will be
discussed shortly. But the authors are correct in pointing out that "subflow" as
used by the courts should only apply to the hydrologic condition where the mound
in the water table is in physical contact with the stream. If it lies below the
bed of the stream, an influent seepage column will exist and no matter how much
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss2/1
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Twenty-five western cases hold that percolating groundwater which
is tributary to a surface watercourse must be treated like surface tributary
watercourses or other surface sources of water. To protect the appropriative
rights of persons diverting water from surface watercourses, all sources of
water which reach such watercourses are subject to the appropriators' rights.
Although virtually all of the decisions subjecting tributary percolating
groundwater flow to the rights of stream users are based on the logic of
the prior appropriation doctrine, 114 one decision applies the doctrine
to percolating groundwater tributary to stream water to which mere riparian
rights attached. 115 Several reasons have been advanced in the cases to justify
attaching surface watercourse rights to tributary percolating groundwater.
Many cases baldly state that this is the rule without providing further
explanation. 116 A few courts have been troubled by the argument supporting the absolute owership rule of groundwater that a landowner should not
be held liable for interference with groundwater or surface streams fed

the water table and the mound is lowered, the amount of water percolating from
the stream will not be increased. Hence, the test formulated by the Arizona courtthat abstraction of groundwater should cause a corresponding decrease in stream
flow or level-is an appropriate one.

114. Cohen v. La Canada Land & Water Co., 142 Cal. 437, 76 P. 47 (1904);

Fellhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968) (dictum); Safranek v.
Town of Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 228 P.2d 975 (1951); Schluter v. Burlington Ditch,
Reservoir & Land Co., 117 Colo. 284, 188 P.2d 253 (1947); Dalpez v. Nix, 96
Colo. 540, 45 P.2d 176 (1935); Leadville Mine Dev. Co. v. Anderson, 91 Colo. 536,
17 P.2d 303 (1932); Nevius v. Smith, 86 Colo. 178, 279 P. 44 (1929); Ft. Morgan
Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo. 256, 206 P. 393 (1922); Clark v.
Ashley, 34 Colo. 285, 82 P. 588 (1905); Bruening v. Dor, 23 Colo. 195, 47 P. 290
(1896); Ogilvy Irrigating & Land Co. v. Insinger, 19 Colo. App. 380, 75 P. 598
(1904); Leonard v. Shatzer, 11 Mont. 422, 28 P. 457 (1892) (dictum); Strait v.
Brown, 16 Nev. 317 (1881); Langenegger v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 82 N.M. 411,
483 P.2d 297 (1971); City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 71 N.M. 428, 379 P.2d
73 (1962); Templeton v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist., 65 N.M. 59, 332
P.2d 465 (1958); Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Sandy City, 123 Utah 242, 258
P.2d 440 (1953) (dictum); Silver King Consol. Mining Co. v. Sutton, 85 Utah
297, 39 P.2d 682 (1934); Bastian v. Nebeker, 49 Utah 390, 163 P. 1092 (1916)
(dictum); Mountain Lake Mining Co. v. Midway Irrigation Co., 47 Utah 346,
149 P. 929 (1915); Herriman Irrigation Co. v. Keel, 25 Utah 96, 69 P. 719 (1902);
Herriman Irrigation Co. v. Butterfield Mining Co., 19 Utah 453, 57 P. 537 (1899);
Midway Irrigation Co. v. Snake Creek Mining & Tunnel Co., 271 F. 157 (8th Cir.
1921), affd, 260 U.S. 596 (1923) (decided under Utah law).

115. McClintock v. Hudson, 141 Cal. 275, 74 P. 849 (1903).
116. Silver King Consol. Mining Co. v. Sutton, 85 Utah 297, 306, 39 P.2d 682,
686 (1934), is representative of these cases:

Appropriators of the waters of natural springs and streams, by virtue of
their appropriations, acquire an interest or right in and to the waters
which feed or supply such springs or streams, even though percolating in
privately owned ground, where the lands supplying such waters were part
of the public domain at the time of appropriation by such prior users.
Most cases stating the bare rule are not so solicitous of the groundwater rights of
patentees from the federal government with respect to surface incidents to appropriative rights acquired after patent.
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by groundwater when the landowner had no way of knowing in advance
the course or direction of flow of groundwater, or what the consequences
of diverting it would be. Nonetheless, they impose liability for such interferences because they feel the need to protect appropriative rights in a
water-scarce environment is greater.1 17 Elaborating on this concept, and
drawing upon an analogy to surface tributaries to the main stream, the
Colorado court has said:
"There is no law anywhere to support the contention that if these
waters are naturally tributary to the river, still they may be taken
by a new claimant to the damage and injury of prior appropriators
upon that stream, simply because he captures and diverts them
before they actually get into the river channel. If such act of capture
and diversion can be upheld as lawful and proper, by the same
reasoning a new claimant could divert the waters of a surface
tributary, if he only be spry enough to capture and divert them
before they actually reach and mingle with the waters of the main
stream."11 8
To put it another way, the same court said in another case:
"It is probably safe to say that it is a matter of no moment whether
water reaches a certain point by percolation through the soil, by
a subterranean channel, or by an obvious surface channel. If by
any of these natural methods it reaches the point, and is there
appropriated in accordance with law, the appropriator has a property in it which cannot be divested by the wrongful diversion by
another, nor can there be any substantial diminution. To hold
otherwise would be to concede to superior owners of land the right
to all sources of supply that go to create a stream, regardless of
the rights of those who previously acquired the right to the use of
the water from the stream below.""19
The Colorado cases proceeded from that beginning to develop the
presumption that all percolating groundwater eventually will find its way
to a surface watercourse and, therefore, will be regarded as tributary flow
unless there is evidence that the percolating groundwater is not tributary
117. In Strait v. Brown, 16 Nev. 317 (1881), the court took this position. Since
it was the first case in point in the west, it was very influential:
It would be a mere pretense of protection of the rights acquired by the
earlier appropriators of the waters of a creek to say that later appropriators could lawfully acquire rights to the springs which constitute the
source of the creek simply because the means by which the waters are
conveyed from the springs to the creek are subterranean and not well
understood. Id. at 324.
See also Clark v. Ashley, 34 Colo. 285, 290, 82 P. 588, 589 (1905); Bruening v. Dorr,
23 Colo. 195, 202, 47 P. 290, 293 (1896).
118. Dalpez v. Nix, 96 Colo. 540, 547, 45 P.2d 176, 179 (1935), quoting Cornstock v. Ramsey, 55 Colo.244, 255, 133 P. 1107, 1111 (1913).
119. Ogilvy Irrigating & Land Co. v. Insinger, 19 Colo. App. 380, 386-87, 75
P. 598, 600 (1904), quoting McClellan v. Hurdle, 3 Colo. App. 430, 484, 33 P. 280,
282 (1893).
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to any surface watercourse.' 20 The tributary flow rule is a general one
and applies to other sources of water besides percolating groundwater.
It is not based on the absence of logical distinction between interferences
between users of the same class of water on one hand and interferences between users of different classes of water on the other, as some subflow
cases are rationalized. Nor is it expressly based on an extended analysis
of the hydrologic relationship between percolating groundwater and surface
watercourses, as other subflow cases are. Nonetheless, the recognition of
the relationship is just as central to the tributary flow doctrine as to the
subflow doctrine. The extension of appropriative rights to all sources of
surface watercourse flow could not be made without that recognition.
2. Conflicting Authority in the East
The eastern cases involving a hydrologic connection between percolating groundwater and surface watercourses fall into four groups: groundwater diversion cases, stream diversion cases, pollution cases, and reservoir
heightening cases. Six of the groundwater diversion cases were decided in
favor of the injured stream user under a high capacity well exception to
the absolute ownership of groundwater which favors the injuring groundwater user. The remainder were split, with about half favoring the injured stream user under surface watercourse rules (principally the natural
flow doctrine), and half favoring the injuring groundwater user under
percolating groundwater rules (principally the absolute ownership rule).
The smaller number of stream diversion cases were split along similar
lines. The pollution cases do not fit into any general category like those
above, although it does seem that nuisance law may favor the injured user.
The reservoir heightening cases fall into two groups. Seven favored the
landowner injured by a raised water table under a trespass theory, a doctrine peculiar to that situation. Eight of the nine remaining cases were split

along the lines mentioned above.12 1 When the cases decided upon doctrines
of special applicability are set aside, it is evident that the courts are
evenly split on whether to follow surface watercourse rules or percolating

groundwater rules. An examination of the reasons expressed by the courts

for choosing a particular rule aids in understanding why the courts have
chosen one set of rules or the other. But these reasons do not help determine
whether one set of rules is to be preferred over the other.
a. Reasons for Following Percolating Groundwater Rules
The absolute ownership and reasonable use rules of groundwater,
followed by most states, hold a groundwater user free from liability for
120. Safranek v. Town of Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 335, 228 P.2d 975, 977 (1951),
quoting McHendrie, The Law of Underground Water, 13 Rocny MT. L. Rzv. 1,
11 (1940).
121. See discussion in text accompanying notes 75-107 supra.
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the injurious consequences of his activities permitted by the rule. This
stems from the concept that percolating groundwater is a part of the soil
itself, like any other mineral buried in the ground.' 22 However, since
percolating groundwater is described as a migratory substance oozing or
filtering through the ground, these rules in actuality amount to rules of
capture similar to those known in oil and gas law. The important distinction
of these rules from eastern surface watercourse rules and the correlative
rights rule of groundwater is that they do not create usufructuary rights,
but, rather, a right to reduce to possession akin to the law of wild animals.
Unlike the latter rules, which treat water as a common resource available
for private use, the absolute ownership and reasonable use rules of groundwater treat groundwater as a privately owned resource. Since there is no
trespassory or nuisance invasion of neighboring lands in the capture of
groundwater, there can be no liability imposed for the injurious consequences arising from that capture.
While the concept of groundwater totally ignores the true hydrologic
characteristics of groundwater movement, it may be sound as a matter of
policy. The first case to set forth the absolute ownership rule, Acton v.
Blundell, stated the difficulties a landowner faces very well:
[I] n the case of a well sunk by a proprietor in his own land, the
water which feeds it from a neighboring soil does not flow openly
in the sight of the neighboring proprietor, but through the hidden
veins of the earth beneath its surface; no man can tell what changes
these underground sources have undergone in the progress of time:
it may well be, that it is only yesterday's date, that they first took
the course and direction which enabled them to supply the well:
again, no proprietor knows what portion of water is taken from
beneath his own soil: how much he gives originally, or how much
he transmits only, or how much he receives: on the contrary,
until the well is sunk, and the water collected by draining into
it, there cannot properly be said, with reference to the well, to be
any flow of water at all. In the case, therefore, of the well, there
can be no ground for implying any mutual consent or agreement,
for ages past, between the owners of the several lands beneath
which the underground springs may exist, which is one of the
foundations on which the law as to running streams is supposed
to be built; nor, for the same reason, can any trace of a positive law
be inferred from long-continued acquiescence and submission,
whilst the very existence of the underground springs or of the well
may be unknown to the proprietors of the soil.123
122. See, e.g., Nourse v. Andrews, 200 Ky. 467, 471-72, 255 S.W. 84, 86 (1923);
Springfield Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74, 80 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895);
White River Chair Co. v. Connecticut River Power Co., 105 Vt. 24, 48, 162 A.
859, 869 (1932); Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, 353-54, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223,
1235 (Ex. 1843).
123. Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, 350-351, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1233-34
(Ex. 1843). See also White River Chair Co. v. Connecticut River Power Co., 105
Vt. 24, 48, 162 A. 859, 869 (1932).
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This rationale set the tone for most of the percolating groundwater decisions which followed. The courts, therefore, are concerned that if correlative rights and duties are imposed upon users of percolating groundwater,
the users will incur liability for injurious consequences they could not
forsee or guard against. 2 4 Such a rule would have an inhibiting effect on
land development. 12 5 To enable a man to make use of available groundwater and to develop his land, no liability should be imposed for the
injurious consequences arising from a land-owner's non-malicious use of
126
groundwater or of his land.
The absolute ownership rule, and the reasonable use rule of groundwater which developed from it, were formulated when there was no scientific
12 7
explanation of or prediction for the movement of underground water.
Because of this, it is very understandable why the courts adopted the rules
they did; if the flow of percolating groundwater and the consequences of
its diversion could not be predicted, the courts were loath to impose a rule
presupposing predictive capability.
124. Ellis v. Duncan, 21 Barb. 230, 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855), stated:
The owners of the surface soil are not generally aware of their existence,
and cannot be supposed to have voluntarily acquiesced in any appropriation of them. When they purchase they are ignorant of any obstacle to
the free use of their property ab center ad calum; and to arrest some valuable improvement, such as digging a well or cellar, draining the land,
taking valuable stones from a quarry, or leveling the ground for building
or agricultural purposes, because it would cause some consequential,
unforeseen and possibly irremediable damage to another, would seem
to be unreasonable and unjust.
See also Bradford Corp. v. Ferrand, [1902] 2 Ch. 655, 663-64.
125. Ellis v. Duncan, 21 Barb. 230, 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855), stated:
If the principle that the man who interrupts a sub-surface stream, to the
prejudice of his neighbor, commits a wrong for which the law will give
redress is sound, no one will be safe in purchasing land adjoining or near
a private stream of water, as he may be restrained forever from making
some valuable, and frequently, from the progressiveness of the age, necessary improvements.
Although the court used the words "sub-surface stream," the case concerns the
interruption of percolating groundwater and it is clear this is what the court
was referring to. See also Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H.L. Cas. 349, 386-87, 11 Eng.
Rep. 140, 155 (1859) (opinion of Lord Wensleydale); Ewart v. Belfast Poor-Law
Guardians, 9 L.R. Ir. 172, 206 (Ch. 1881).
126. In Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H.L. Cas. 349, 387, 11 Eng. Rep. 140, 155
(1859), Lord Wensleydale stated:
tAls the great interests of society require that the cultivation of every man's
land should be encouraged, and its natural advantages made fully available, the owner must be permitted to dig in his own soil, and, in so
doing, he can very rarely avoid interfering with the subterraneous waters
flowing or percolating in his neighbour's land.
See also Bradford Corp. v. Ferrand, [1902] 2 Ch. 655, 664.
127. The science of hydrology was formulated as late as 1923 and the current
theory of groundwater movement was first studied extensively about 1940. See
0. ME NZER, THE OcCURRENCE oF GROUND WATER IN THE UNITED STATES (U.S. Geo.
Survey Water Supply Paper No. 489, 1923); 0. MEINZER, OUTLINE OF GROUND

WATER HYDROLOGY, wiTH DEFINITIONS (U.S. Geo. Survey Water Supply Paper
No. 494, 1923); Hubbert, The Theory of Ground-water Motion, 48 J. GEOL. 785

(1940).
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b. Adoption of Correlative Rights Rule
A few courts were not stymied by the absence of knowledge about the
movements of percolating groundwater. As early as 1868, the New Hampshire courts applied to percolating groundwater the same rules that applied
to surface watercourses. In Bassett v. Salisbury Manufacturing Co., a reser-

voir heightening case, the court, after describing the reasons for the absolute ownership rule, stated:
It seems to us inconsistent to hold that ordinarily you may not
drain a water-course by digging away the bank, which is your
land, and yet to sustain a doctrine which would allow you to dig
so near it as to draw off all its water by percolation. In either case
you deal directly with your own merely; but in the former you are
forbidden, only because by so doing you take what is not absolutely
your own; because you drain a water course.... In the other case
exactly the same reason exists for not doing a similar act, producing
precisely the same effects, that constitute the only objection in the
former, and therefore the law of the cases should be the same; and
it would seem to follow that ordinarily you may not drain a watercourse dry by means of percolation into your pits. Although the
law does not generally allow one directly to deprive the land-owners
below of the natural advantages of a common water-course, yet
this doctrine, as held in some of the cases, would sometimes permit
this mischief indirectly, by allowing all the sources of supply to be
cut off from the stream. ...
[T]he regulations now settled by the law of water-courses were
established, not because of any peculiarity in the origin of water
in streams, but because of the good or harm that may result from
its management or use. Therefore, so far as a similarity of benefits
and injuries exists, there should be a similarity in the rules of law
applied. 128
This is the same type of reasoning the California court expressed in Miller.
The court, therefore, applied the same correlative rights to users of perco20
lating groundwater as already applied to users of surface watercourses.'
Not only should similar rules apply to similar situations-where the
acts, consequences, and sometimes even the water are the same-but the
assumption that the movement of percolating groundwater is unknown, an
assumption central to the absolute ownership rule, sometimes is false. As
Justice Coleridge pointed out in dissent in the English Court of Exchequer
case of Chasemore v. Richards:

The course by which the diverted water here percolates, is not
indeed seen, nor has it any one channel defined by visible banks,
but its direction is as well known as if it ran in such a channel on
128. Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569, 573-76 (1862).
129. Id. at 577-78. See also Cason v. Florida Power Co., 74 Fla. 1, 7, 76 So. 535,
536 (1917) (another reservoir heightening case).
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the surface, and is regulated by as ancient and well known and as
varying a law as the descent of any superficial stream. Further,
the act of diversion cannot be considered an act done in ignorance;
the plaintiff's ancient right the defendant must be taken to have
known, and that the uninterrupted percolation of water to the
stream was necessary to the full enjoyment of it; he has diverted
that percolation by a combination of continued acts, of which
the arbitrator finds "the natural effect to be reasonably expected," was to produce the injurious consequences actually experienced.13 0
Although Chasemore v. Richards involved diversion of groundwater percolating downhill to feed a stream powering a mill, Coleridge's observations
could apply to any situation where the movement of percolating groundwater was in fact known or a matter of local repute.
c. Reasons for Following Surface Watercourse Rules
The cases decided upon the natural flow doctrine of riparian rights
have taken up the same logic as expressed in Bassett. Most of these cases
involved either virtual diversion of stream water from streamside wells'8 1
or high capacity pumping. 32 A public water supply system was the usual
diverter in both situations. Typical of the courts' attitudes in these cases
is the following statement:
No man can rightfully dig a channel from a running stream, and
thus divert the waters thereof to the injury of a lower proprietor.
What he cannot do directly, he cannot do indirectly. 33
An English decision casts the same idea into more general terms, which
apply to any groundwater diversion which adversely affects stream flow:
You have a right to all the water which you can draw from the
different sources which may percolate underground; but that has
no bearing at all on what you may do with regard to water which
is in a defined channel, and which you are not to touch. If you cannot get at the underground water without touching the water in a
defined surface channel, I think you cannot get at it at all. You are
not by your operations, or by any act of yours, to diminish the
water which runs in this defined channel, because that is not only
130. Chasemore v. Richards, 2 H. &cN. 168, 191-92, 157 Eng. Rep. 71, 79-80

(Ex. 1857) (dissenting opinion of Coleridge, J.).

131. Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 234 A.2d 825 (1967);

Harper Hollingsworth &cDarby Co. v. Mountain Water Co., 65 N.J.Eq. 479, 56 A.
297 (Ch. 1903); Warder &cBarnett v. Springfield, 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 855 (C.P.
1887).
132. Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 32 App. Div. 257, 52 N.Y.S. 983 (1898), afrd,
160 N.Y. 357, 54 N.E. 787 (1899).
133. Warder & Barnett v. Springfield, 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 855, 859 (C.P.

1887). See also Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 487, 234 A.2d
825, 831 (1967); Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 160 N.Y. 357, 360-61, 54 N.E. 787, 788
(1899); Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520, 529 (1866).
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for yourself, but for your neighbors also, who can have a clear
right to use it, and have it come to them unimpaired in quality
and undiminished in quantity. 134
The same position is taken by the cases which impose liability on virtual
diversions of stream water by streamside wells, under the induced underground current theory.' 3 5
d. Discussion
Most of the natural flow decisions, including all of those just discussed, involved diversions of groundwater which were described as being
subterfuges for prohibited stream diversions. The hydrologic connection
between percolating groundwater and surface watercourses is inescapable
in that situation and cannot be denied without substantial injustice. These
cases do not help us with the more general relationship between percolating groundwater and surface watercourses, which can take many different
forms and involve many different relationships between landowners and
water users. There are no natural flow cases which can shed light on this
more general relationship. Although the language from Bassett v. Salisbury Manufacturing Co. (the correlative rights case discussed previously)
is useful, as precedent applying to the general situation it is weak. It deals
with the reservoir heightening situation. Most of these cases grant relief
to the injured landowner, many under a trespass, theory.186 The result in
Bassett is not unexpected or unusual. But the correlative rights theory
which it spawned has been followed up by other jurisdictions in ordinary
groundwater allocation situations.13 7 The rationales expressed in these
latter cases apply equally well where a hydrologic connection between
percolating groundwater and surface watercourses exists.' 38 The attitude
expressed by the court in Smith v. City of Brooklyn, a groundwater diversion case, although decided on the basis of the reasonable use rule of
groundwater because the groundwater was being transported to nonoverlying land, seems the appropriate one to take:
There is certainly an inconsistency in the rule which gives to an
134. Grand Junction Canal Co. v. Shugar, L.R. 6 Ch. 483, 487-88 (C.A. 1871).
135. See, e.g., Hollingsworth & Vose Co. v. Foxborough Water Supply Dist., 165
Mass. 186, 188, 42 N.E. 574 (1896); Proprietors of Mills v. Braintree Water
Supply Co., 149 Mass. 478, 484, 21 N.E. 761, 762 (1889); Aetna Mills v. Brookline, 127 Mass. 69, 71 (1879).
136. See cases cited note 77 supra.
137. See cases cited note 53 supra.
138. See, e.g., Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Rickert, 19 Tenn. App. 446, 457, 89
S.W.2d 889, 896 (1936) (dictum), where the court stated:
[T]he modern rule and "The better rule is that the rights of each owner
being similar, and their enjoyment dependent on the action of other landowners, their right must be correlative and subject to the maxim that
one must so use his own as not to injure another, so that each landowner
is restricted to a reasonable exercise of his own rights and a reasonable
use of his own property, in view of the similar rights of others." [ 27 R.C.L.
Waters § 93, at 1174 (1920).]
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owner of land the usufruct of a stream which exists as a right
ex natura, and yet vests in another, in his search after underground
water, the right to destroy the stream absolutely. There is no difference in the injury inflicted, if the stream be taken, whether it
be brought about by drawing the water from the stream itself, or
cutting off the supply ....
We think [the right in a stream] is
not ... limited [to the present particles of water], that the right
is in and to the stream as a distinct entity, and that, where its source
is known and its channel defined, an adjoining owner has ordinarily no right so to use his property as to work a destruction of the
stream. 139
This is the concept which the western courts have adopted uniformly. The
language in Miller is especially appropriate because its logic squares with
reality. It should be considered for widespread application in the eastern
states.
e. Applicability of Various Rules Today
Most eastern cases involving a hydrologic connection between percolating groundwater and surface watercourses are decided under either of
two groups of doctrines. The one-half decided in favor of the injuring
user followed the absolute ownership rule, which does not impose liability
for a non-malicious interference with groundwater, or the reasonable use
rule of groundwater, which allows non-malicious interference provided the
use of water is on the diverter's own overlying land. Most of the other
half of the cases were decided in favor of the injured user under either of
the riparian rights doctrines, which protect the integrity of surface watercourses. Most of these involved the special situations of streamside wells.
Therefore, it would appear that in the general situation, where an ordinary
well (not a high-capacity well where a special rule may apply) reduces
the amount of water flowing in a stream or where a stream diversion depletes groundwater supplies, the courts probably will deny relief under the
absolute ownership or reasonable use rules of groundwater. Most states
follow one or the other of those two rules.
Absolute ownership is followed in Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Wisconsin. 140 The reasonable use rule of groundwater is
followed in Alabama, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, New
139. Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 18 App. Div. 340, 349, 46 N.Y.S. 141, 147
(1897).
140. See, e.g., Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 532 (1850); New York Continental
Filtration Co. v. Jones, 37 App. D.C. 511 (Ct. App. 1911); City of Atlanta v.
Hudgins, 193 Ga. 618, 19 S.E.2d 508 (1942); Behrens v. Scharringhausen, 22 Ill.
App. 2d 326, 161 N.E.2d 44 (1959); Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co.,
163 Ind. 687, 72 N.E. 849 (1904); Gainer v. Town of Milton, 346 Mass. 617, 195
N.E.2d 65 (1964); Clarke County v. Mississippi Lumber Co., 80 Miss. 535, 31
So. 905 (1902); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 A. 627 (1934);
White River Chair Co. v. Connecticut River Power Co., 105 Vt. 24, 162 A. 859
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Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. 141 Only a few states have adopted the correlative rights rules, which
consider the right to use groundwater a usufructuary rather than proprietary
right and recognize the hydrologic connection between percolating groundwater and surface watercourses. These states are Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,
142
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, and Tennessee.
Only in the correlative rights states is it likely that the western attitude toward the recognition of the hydrologic connection between percolating groundwater and surface watercourses will be implemented. In most
of the eastern states, groundwater allocation rules, developed in an era
when percolating groundwater movement was not understood, still hold
sway-even though the theory of groundwater movement has been developed and testing methods have been created to locate and map such
movements.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is time for the courts in the eastern states to take off their blinders
and update their groundwater allocation rules to correspond with presentday knowledge and techniques. The theory of groundwater movement has
been developed and has been proven to be accurate. 143 Methods for determining the direction and volume of percolating groundwater flow are
well developed. Since information about groundwater movement can now
be made available by routine methods, the assumption that it is unknown
can no longer justify the absolute ownership and reasonable use rules of
groundwater. However, the contention that the groundwater user should
not be subject to liability when he cannot predict in advance the injurious
consequences of groundwater use still has validity. The reason is that the
tests necessary to determine groundwater movements and injurious con(1932); Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 355, 94 N.W. 354 (1903). The Illinois and
Indiana decisions cited above suggest a change to the reasonable use rule may be
in the offing.
141. Sloss-Sheffield Steel &Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 231 Ala. 511, 165 So. 764 (1936);
DeBok v. Doak, 188 Iowa 597, 176 N.W. 631 (1920); Associated Contract. Stone
Co. v. Pewee Valley Sanitarium & Hosp., 376 S.W.2d 316 (Ky. 1963); Chesley v.
King, 74 Me. 164 (1882); Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 251 Md. 603, 248 A.2d
106 (1968); Bernard v. City of St. Louis, 220 Mich. 159, 189 N.W. 891 (1922);
Crane v. Borough of Essex Fells, 67 N.J. Super. 83, 169 A.2d 845 (Ch. 1961);
Dunbar v. Sweeney, 230 N.Y. 609, 130 N.E. 913 (1921); Bayer v. Nello L. Teer
Co., 256 N.C. 509, 124 S.E.2d 552 (1962); Logan Gas Co. v. Glasgo, 122 Ohio St.
126, 170 N.E. 874 (1930); Township of Hatfield v. Lansdale Municipal Authority,
403 Pa. 113, 168 A.2d 333 (1961); Drummond v. White Oak Fuel Co., 104 W. Va.
368, 140 S.E. 57 (1927).
142. Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 228 Ark. 76, 306 S.W.2d 111 (1957);
MacArtor v. Graylyn Crest III Swim Club, Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 53, 173 A.2d 344
(CI. 1962) (remanding), 41 Del. Ch. 26, 187 A.2d 417 (1963); Koch v. Wick, 87
So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1956); Erickson v. Crookston Waterworks Power 8 Light Co., 105
Minn. 182, 117 N.W. 435 (1908); Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1971); Moore v. Berlin Mills Co., 74 N.H. 305, 67 A. 578 (1907); Nashville,
C. & St. L. Ry. v. Rickert, 19 Tenn. App. 446, 89 S.W.2d 889 (1936).
143. See note 127 supra.
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sequences are expensive.144 It would seem unjust to impose liability on a
landowner who cannot afford to make these tests, when he has not made
them, by charging him with constructive knowledge of what he would
have learned. But it also seems ludicrous to presume that a landowner does
not know the results of such tests when, in fact, he has made them. There
are decisions of this kind, 145 and some courts have wisely balked at denying
relief in this situation. 4 6 The high-capacity well pumping situation is
typical. No competent man is going to put in an extremely expensive large
well, for municipal purposes for example, unless he has first made hydrologic tests to determine whether there is enough groundwater available to
feed the well. This was true in Higday and was one of the major factors
inducing the court to adopt the correlative rights rule and grant relief to
the neighboring landowners who might lose their groundwater supply. 147
144. The two methods that have been developed to measure groundwater
movement are clearly expensive. The first method involves putting in a pattern
of test wells. Groundwater is pumped from one of the centrally located wells at
a constant rate and the fall in the water table in the other observation wells is
measured at intervals in time. The correlation of the pumping rate and the fall
in the water table at the various observation wells, which reveals the dimensions
of the cone of depression, allows computation of the effective transmissibility of
the aquifer and its coefficient of storage, and reveals the hydrogeologic boundaries,
impermeable discontinuities and potential recharge boundaries of the aquifer. The
second method involves the injection into groundwater of a slug of tracer, often
a fluorescent dye, which is carried along with the moving groundwater to observation wells below. Within the limits imposed by the diffusion, dispersion, dilution
and absorption of the tracer, this method allows the determination of the direction and rate of flow of groundwater. See, e.g., Todd, Groundwater,in HANDBOOK
OF APPLIED HYDROLOGY 13:12-13:27 (yen Te Chow, ed. 1964). See also 1- KAZMANN,
MODERN HYDROLOGY 153-58 (1965); R. WARn, PRiNCIPLEs OF HYDROLOGY 276-84
(1967).
145. See, e.g., Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861) (the headnote to the

contrary notwithstanding); Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 355, 94 N.W. 354 (1903);
Chasemore v. Richards, 2 H. & N. 168, 157 Eng. Rep. 71 (Ex. 1857), affd, 7 H.L.
Cas. 349, 11 Eng. Rep. 140 (1859); Broadbent v. Ramsbotham, 11 Ex. 602, 156
Eng. Rep. 971 (1856); Rugby Joint Water Bd. v. Walters, [1967] Ch. 397 (1966);
M'Nab v. Robertson, [1897] A.C. 129 (Scot. 1896).
146. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Grand Junction Canal Co., 7 Ex. 282, 155 Eng.
Rep. 953 (1852), a streamside well case, where the court said:
In the present case, the water is proved to have been taken from the river
after it formed part of its stream, not by the reasonable use of it by another
iparian proprietor, but by the digging of a well, which is clearly a diversion; and an action will lie at common law against the Company for the
injury which has resulted from that unauthorized act to the known right
of the mill-owners. If, indeed, it had appeared that the Company were
ignorant, and could not by any degree of care have ascertained, before
making the well, that it would have the effect of abstracting the water,
and when they discovered that it did, could not have repaired the mischief,
it might have raised a question whether the action was maintainable....
Id. at 301, 155 Eng. Rep. 961.
See also Bleachers' Ass'n, Ltd. v. Chapel-en-le-Frith Rural Dist. Council, [1933]
Ch. 356, 363-64 (1932).
147. In Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971), the court
said:
[R]espondent City's decision to turn to the McBaine Bottom as the source
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It is also the factor that has prompted some courts to formulate a highcapacity well exception to the absolute ownership rule.1 48 A landowner
who has made hydrologic tests should be charged with the knowledge
gained from those tests, and should be held liable for unreasonable adverse consequences inflicted upon his neighbors' groundwater supplies.
The author believes that eastern groundwater allocation rules should
be modified to reflect the current state of knowledge and the expense of
hydrologic testing. There should be two rules, one applying to high-capacity
wells and the other applying to small wells. High capacity wells should be
defined as those wells that a reasonable man would not install without
first making hydrologic tests to determine the availability of adequate
groundwater supplies, or obtaining information previously developed by
others yielding substantially the same results as new tests. With respect to
such wells, the landowner should be charged with the knowledge the tests
revealed about groundwater movement and effects on neighboring users of
groundwater and stream water or, if the tests are not made, what they
would have revealed. He should be held liable for any unreasonable injurious consequences which could have been predicted from the test
results under the correlative rights rule of groundwater or some similar
rule requiring a comparison of the reasonableness of conflicting uses.
With respect to small wells, a different rule should apply. Small wells
are those wells a reasonable man would be expected to install without
making the substantial and expensive hydrologic tests necessary to determine
groundwater movement. The landowner should be charged only with
knowledge about groundwater movement of local repute, information
actually known by him, or previously developed information which he
could consult that a reasonable man would be expected to search out. He
should be held liable for unreasonable injurious consequences which could
have been predicted from that smaller body of information, and not for
other injurious consequences. It is unjust to require a landowner to make
of its water supply was made only after careful scientific analysis confirmed
that this land was particularly adaptable for water production. At the time
the City acquired the well and water treatment sites, it had full knowledge
of the dimensions of the underlying aquifer, the volume of groundwater
it contained, the daily rate of recharge, the direction and rate of flow,
the normal water level and, at the rate of capture contemplated by the
City, the level to which the groundwater would be lowered. The City cannot be permitted to escape liability by appeals to a doctrine which assumes
that the very information the City has acted upon was not available to
it. Id. at 869.
148. See, e.g., Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522, 58 N.E. 644 (1900),
where the court said:
Before the defendant constructed its wells and pumping stations it ascertained, at least to a business certainty, that such was the percolation and
underground flow or situation of the water in its own and the plaintiff's
land that it could by these wells and appliances cause or compel the water
in the plaintiff's land to flow into its own wells, and thus could deprive
the plaintiff of his natural supply of underground water. Id. at 524, 58
N.E. at 645.
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expensive hydrologic tests which are not justified by the size of the well or
the volume of water proposed to be diverted. The small well rule satisfies
the concerns which gave rise to the absolute ownership and reasonable use
rules of groundwater, without stretching the assumptions underlying those
rules to illogical limits.
The rules suggested here correlate well with the existing rules applicable to underground streams. Courts apply watercourse rules to underground streams that are known and have a course and direction discernible
from the surface of the ground. If such streams are unknown, or if their
course and direction can be ascertained only by excavation, the courts
traditionally have refused to apply surface watercourse rules and instead
treat the streams as percolating groundwater. 149 The author suggests that
the same test be applied to underground streams as to percolating groundwater. If a diverter of an underground stream knows of its existence, course,
and direction, or has made hydrologic tests and has obtained that information, he should be held liable for unreasonable injurious consequences
arising from the diversion.1 50 If he has diverted an underground stream in
great enough quantities so that he should have made hydrologic tests, but
did not, he should be held liable on the basis of the facts the tests would
have revealed. But he should not be held liable for unreasonable injurious
consequences arising from diversions where he had not made tests, would
not be expected to make tests, and lacked actual knowledge of the existence,
course, and direction of an underground stream. Such a rule would involve
only a slight variation and extension of liability from the present position
of the law.
The high capacity well and small well rules suggested here do not
necessarily require the imposition of a limitation requiring use of the diverted water on overlying land. Such a limitation probably makes sense,
at least for substantial diversions, but could be regarded as one element
of comparative reasonableness instead of an independent constraint.
As the body of knowledge about groundwater movement grows and
149. See, e.g., cases cited note 47 supra.
150. The court in Bleachers' Ass'n, Ltd. v. Chapel-en-le-Frith Rural Dist.
Council, [1933] Ch. 356 (1932), suggested that a landowner made aware of the
existence of an underground stream by excavations cannot make further interferences with the stream with impunity:
The point of law [in Bradford Corp. v. Ferrand, [1902] 2 Ch. 655] was
I think confined to the case where the existence and course of the defined
channel is not known at the date of the issue of the writ and cannot
be ascertained except by excavation subsequent to its issue, because once
it is established that there is a defined underground channel and that its
course can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, the rights of the lower
riparian owner are crystallized and any fresh act of interference or abstraction which-ex hypothesi must be done with knowledge of those rightsmust then be actionable; in other words the liability for abstraction or
interference must depend on the knowledge of the actor at the time the
act complained of is committed and not on the manner in which that
knowledge has been obtained. Id. at 368-64.
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as the techniques for measuring it decrease in cost, the two rules would
automatically shift the dividing line between high capacity wells and
small wells to require more landowners to make hydrologic tests and to
be subjected to liability under a comparative reasonableness test. At the
same time the rules afford some protection to the innocent small user
whose diversions in the usual situation are likely to be innocuous to his
neighbors.151
The rules suggested here would be equally applicable to situations involving the hydrologic connection between percolating groundwater and
surface watercourses. They would remedy the illogic accepted by many
eastern courts that percolating groundwater, diffused surface water and
surface watercourses constitute independent classes of water. In the case of
substantial diversions, which cause most of the major interferences with
uses of water by others, they would recognize the hydrologic cycle the
western courts have recognized for many years. They would also provide
relief for major interferences without burdening the small groundwater
diverter with unpredictable liabilities, and would put an end to the absolute ownership rule, which has become an absurdity in the law with the
passage of time and the growth of hydrologic technology.

151. Because of their possible pervasive effects, the author does not believe
the small well rule he proposes should protect any discharger of wastes into
groundwater aquifers. Discharge of wastes into any body of water, surface or
underground, should be subject to liability under a comparative reasonableness
test that emphasizes protection of water quality and strongly discourages the
degradation of domestic water supplies or creation of nuisances.
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CASES DISCUSSING HYDROLOGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
PERCOLATING GROUNDWATER AND SURFACE WATERCOURSES
(Cases marked " acknowledge the hydrologic connection.)
I.

INFLUENT STREAI

(water leaves stream)
A. DiversionFrom Stream Lowers GroundwaterLevel and Yield
1. Percolating Groundwater Rules Followed
a. Absolute Ownership
*Maricopa County Municipal Water Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. Southwest
Cotton Co., 39 Ariz. 65, 4 P.2d 369 (1931) (re: percolating groundwater not part
of subflow of surface stream; diversion from stream reduced yield of nearby well);
Heninger v. McGinnis, 131 Va. 70, 108 S.E. 671 (1921) (diversion from spring
whose water flowed in a stream to a marsh dried up springs below the marsh).
b. Reasonable Use
*Miller v. Bay Cities Water Co., 157 Cal. 256, 107 P. 115 (1910) (proposed
diversion from river alleged would dry up aquifer parallel to and fed by river);
Springfield Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895)
(stopping flow of river at dam dried up spring).
c. Correlative Rights
None.
d. Common Pool
*Maricopa County Municipal Water Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. Southwest
Cotton Co., 39 Ariz. 65, 4 P.2d 369 (1931).
2. Surface Watercourse Rules Followed
a. Riparian Rights
i. Natural Flow Doctrine
4Craig v. Shippensburg Borough, 7 Pa. Super. 526 (1898) (obstruction of
stream by reservoir dried up spring near stream below dam).
ii. Reasonable Use Doctrine
*Miller v. Bay Cities Water Co., 157 Cal. 256, 107 P. 115 (1910).
b. Prior Appropriation
*Maricopa County Municipal Water Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. Southwest
Cotton Co., 39 Ariz. 65, 4 P.2d 369 (1931) (re: subflow of stream).
3. Other Special Rules Followed
None.
B. Reduction in Reservoir Level Lowers Water Table
1. Percolating Groundwater Rules Followed
a. Absolute Ownership
In re Miami Conservancy Dist., 25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 325 (C.P. 1924) (river level
lowered by dredging bed dried up well).
b. Reasonable Use
None.
c. Correlative Rights
None.
d. Common Pool
None.
2. Surface Watercourse Rules Followed
a. Riparian Rights
i. Natural Flow Doctrine
None.
ii. Reasonable Use Doctrine
None.
b. Prior Appropriation
None.
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3. Other Special Rules Followed

None.
C. Raised Reservoir Level Raises Water Table
1. Percolating Groundwater Rules Followed
a. Absolute Ownership
None.
b. Reasonable Use
None.
c. Correlative Rights

*Cason v. Florida Power Co., 74 Fla. 1, 76 So. 535 (1917) (reservoir raised
water table and made land unusable for any purpose); *Moore v. Berlin Mills Co.,
74 N.H. 305, 67 A. 578 (1907).
d. Common Pool
None.
2. Surface Watercourse Rules Followed
a. Riparian Rights
i. Natural Flow Doctrine
*Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. Ct. App. 520 (1866) (mill dam raised water table
and made land unfit for cultivation).
ii. Reasonable Use Doctrine
None.
b. Prior Appropriation
None.
3. Other Special Rules Followed
a. Trespass-Flooding Compensation
*Belkus v. City of Brockton, 282 Mass. 285, 184 N.E. 812 (1933) (obstruction
in stream raised water table and flooded cellar); *Wilson v. City of New Bedford,
108 Mass. 261 (1871) (reservoir raised water table, flooded cellar, and waterlogged soil 1000 feet away); *Fuller v. Chicopee Mfg. Co., 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 46
(1860) (reservoir raised water table and flooded a well); *Monson & Brimfield
Mfg. Co. v. Fuller, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 554 (1834) (reservoir raised water table
and reduced productivity of meadow); *Odell v. Nyack Waterworks Co., 91 Hun
283, 36 N.Y.S. 206 (Sup. Ct. 1895) (reservoir raised water table and collapsed
well); *Robb v. State, 174 Misc. 180, 20 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Ct. Cl. 1940) (navigation
canal raised water table and flooded quarry); *Barberton v. Miksch, 12 Ohio L.
Abs. 245 (Ct. App. 1932), aff'd, 128 Ohio St. 169, 190 N.E. 387 (1934) (reservoir
raised water table and made land too wet for cultivation).
b. Nuisance
*Welliver v. Irondale Elec. Light, Heat &Power Co., 38 Pa. Super. 26 (1909)
(mill race raised water table).
c. Negligence
*Mowday v. Moore, 133 Pa. 598, 19 A. 626 (1890) (mill race raised water table
and flooded cellar).
D. Pumping or Groundwater Drainage Draws Water from Stream and Reduces
Stream Flow
1. Percolating Groundwater Rules Followed
a. Absolute Ownership
*English v. Metropolitan Water Bd., [1907] 1 K.B. 588 (re: subsurface support,
but not directly induced abstraction; streamside well lowered water table and
nearly dried up stream, destroying a fish breeding business).
b. Reasonable Use
None.
c. Correlative Rights
None.
d. Common Pool
None.
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2. Surface Watercourse Rules
a. Riparian Rights
i. Natural Flow Doctrine
Harper Hollingsworth &cDarby Co. v. Mountain Water Co., 65 N.J. Eq. 479,
56 A. 297 (Ch. 1903) (streamside well reduced flow in mill race); *Covert v. City
of Brooklyn, 6 App. Div. 73, 39 N.Y.S. 744 (1896) (construction trench across
stream bed diverted stream flow by percolation); *Covert v. Valentine, 66 Hun
32, 21 N.Y.S. 219 (Sup. Ct. 1892), rev'd on other grounds. 141 N.Y. 421, 36 N.E.
297 (1894) (same); *Dickinson v. Grand Junction Canal Co., 7 Ex. 282, 155 Eng.
Rep. 953 (1852) (well sucked water from river); *Grand Junction Canal Co. v.
Shugar, L.R. 6 Ch. App. 382 (1871) (drain lowered water table and level of pond).
ii. Reasonable Use
*Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal. 2d
489, 45 P.2d 972 (1935) (re: subflow of river; proposed wells would induce seepage
from rivers and reduce their flows); *Metropolitan Util. Dist. v. Merritt Beach
Co., 179 Neb. 783, 140 N.W.2d 626 (1966) (re: subflow of river; proposed well
field would reduce flow in river).
b. Prior Appropriation
Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489,
45 P.2d 972 (1935); *Montecito Valley Water Co. v. City of Santa Barbara, 144
Cal. 578, 77 P. 1113 (1904) (re: subsurface support of stream; underground collection tunnel draws water from stream); *Lemm v. Rutherford, 76 Cal. App. 455,
245 P. 225 (1926); *Model Land & Irrigation Co. v. Hoehne Ditch Co., 70 Colo.
484, 202 P. 712 (1921) (re: induced diversions from streams; streamside collection
gallery diverts surface and underground flow of river); *Langenegger v. Carlsbad
Irrigation Dist., 82 N.M. 411, 483 P.2d 297 (1971) (application for license to
substitute groundwater diversion for river diversion rendered ineffective by reduced
river flows caused by well pumping); Carlsbad Irrigation Dist. v. Ford, 46 N.M.
335, 128 P.2d 1047 (1942) (wells divert river flow); *Little Cottonwood Water
Co. v. Sandy City, 123 Utah 242, 258 P.2d 440 (1953) (dictum re: tributary flow
of stream; well allegedly diverted river flow).
3. Other Special Rules Followed
a. Induced Underground Current
*Hollingsworth &cVose Co. v. Foxborough Water-Supply Co., 165 Mass. 186,
42 N.E. 574 (1896) (wells lowered level of artificial pond); *Proprietors of Mills
v. Braintree Water Supply Co., 149 Mass. 478, 21 N.E. 761 (1889) (streamside
filter gallery reduced flow in river from pond to mill); *Aetna Mills v. Brookline,
127 Mass. 69 (1879) (streamside filter basin reduced mill water flow); *Aetna
Mills v. Waltham, 126 Mass. 422 (1879) (same); *Van Wycklen v. City of Brooklyn,
118 N.Y. 424, 24 N.E. 179 (1890) (by implication) (streamside well system reduced
flow in stream to well); *English v. Metropolitan Water Bd., [1907J 1 K.B. 588
(dictum) (streamside well lowered water table and nearly dried up stream, destroy.
ing a fish breeding business).
E. Stream PollutionDegrades Groundwater
1. Percolating Groundwater Rules Followed
a. Absolute Ownership
None.
b. Reasonable Use
None.
c. Correlative Rights
None.
d. Common Pool
None.
2. Surface Watercourse Rules Followed
a. Riparian Rights
i. Natural Flow Doctrine
None.
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ii. Reasonable Use Doctrine
None.
b. Prior Appropriation
None.
3. Other Special Rules Followed
c. Nuisance
*Haynor v. Excelsior Springs Light, Power, Heat & Water Co., 129 Mo. App.
691, 108 S.W. 580 (K.C. Ct. App. 1908) (oil and grease escaping into stream
polluted well).
II. EMrLUENT STREAM
(water enters stream)
A. Pumping or GroundwaterDrainageReduces Additions to Stream and Reduces
Its Flow
1. Percolating Groundwater Rules Followed
a. Absolute Ownership
Hartford Rayon Corp. v. Cromwell Water Co., 126 Conn. 194, 10 A. 2d 587
(1940) (proposed wells would intercept mill water flow in stream); Stoner v.
Patten, 124 Ga. 754, 52 S.E. 894 (1906) (interlocutory appeal), 132 Ga. 178, 63
S.E. 897 (1909) (diverted spring caused loss of stream flow); Nourse v. Andrews,
200 Ky. 467, 255 S.W. 84 (1923) (proposed diversion of spring would reduce river
flow); Spaulding v. Plainville, 218 Mass. 321, 105 N.E. 1006 (1914) (dictum) (well
field reduced flow to millpond); Chelsea Dye House & Laundry Co. v. Common.
wealth, 164 Mass. 350, 41 N.E. 649 (1895) (sewer line severed aquifer feeding
stream); Hart v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., 133 Mass. 488 (1882) (dictum)
(well lowered pond level); Van Wycklen v. City of Brooklyn, 118 N.Y. 424, 24
N.E. 179 (1890) (dictum re: interception of percolating groundwater); Covert
v. Valentine, 66 Hun 32, 21 N.Y.S. 219 (Sup. Ct. 1892), rev'd on other grounds,
141 N.Y. 521, 36 N.E. 597 (1894) (dictum re: interception of percolating groundwater); *Herriman Irrigation Co. v. Keel, 25 Utah 96, 69 P. 719 (1902) (well dried
up stream); Fire Dist. No. I v. Graniteville Spring Water Co., 103 Vt. 89, 152 A.
42 (1930) (wells cause reduction in stream flow to reservoir); Chasemore v. Richards, 2 H. & N. 168, 157 Eng. Rep. 71 (Ex. 1857), affd, 7 H.L. Cas. 349, 11 Eng.
Rep. 140 (1859) (well caused reduction in stream flow to mill); Broadbent v.
Ramsbotham, 11 Ex. 602, 156 Eng. Rep. 971 (1856) (drain caused reduction in
stream flow to mill); Rugby Joint Water Bd. v. Walters, [1967] Ch. 397 (1966)
(groundwater diversion reduced flow in river); Bleacher's Ass'n Ltd. v. Chapelen-le-Frith Rural Dist. Council, [1933] Ch. 356 (1932) (proposed groundwater
diversion would reduce stream flow from spring to factory); Bradford Corp. v.
Ferrand, [1902] 2 Ch. 655 (wells caused a reduction in stream flow from a spring
to a city and to mills); Ewart v. Belfast Poor-Law Guardians, 9 L.R. Ir. 172
(Ch. 1881) (drain caused reduction in stream flow from spring to mill); M'Nab
v. Robertson, [1897] A.C. 129 (Scot. 1896) (marsh drains intercepted groundwater
percolating to pond).
b. Reasonable Use
Freidland v. State, 35 App. Div. 2d 755, 314 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1970) (highway
drainage ditches dried up pond); Covert v. City of Brooklyn, 6 App. Div. 73, 39
N.Y.S. 744 (1896) (dictum re: interception of percolating groundwater); *Stevens
v. Spring Valley Water Works & Supply Co., 42 Misc. 2d 86, 247 N.Y.S.2d 503
(Sup. Ct. 1964) (diversion of groundwater dried up stream).
c. Correlative Rights
None.
d. Common Pool
None.
2. Surface Watercourse Rules Followed
a. Riparian Rights
i. Natural Flow Doctrine
*City of Los Angeles v. Hunter, 156 Cal. 603, 105 P. 755 (1909) (re: flow
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tributary to stream; wells reduced stream flow); *Verdugo Canon Water Co. v.
Verdugo, 152 Cal. 655, 93 P. 1021 (1908) (re: sub-surface support; wells reduced
stream flow); *McClintock v. Hudson, 141 Cal. 275, 74 P. 849 (1903) (groundwater diversion reduced stream flow); *Merrick Water Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 32
App. Div. 454, 53 N.Y.S. 10 (1898) (dictum; wells allegedly dried up stream);
*Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 32 App. Div. 257, 52 N.Y.S. 983 (1898), affd, 160 N.Y.
357, 54 N.E. 787 (1899) (well field dried up ponds); *Warder & Barnett v. Springfield, 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 855 (C.P. 1887) (proposed filtering gallery would reduce
stream flow to mill).
ii. Reasonable Use Doctrine
Fire Dist. No. 1 v. Graniteville Spring Water Co., 103 Vt. 89, 152 A. 42 (1930)
(dictum re: diversion of water in spring).
b. Prior Appropriation
*Cohen v. La Canada Land SeWater Co., 142 Cal. 437, 76 P. 47 (1904) (re:
flow tributary to stream; tunnel intercepted water feeding spring-fed stream);
*Fellhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968) (dictum re: flow tributary
to stream; attorney-general action to enjoin pumping from alluvium of river);
-City of Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961) (re: tributary subflow of stream; wells reduced stream flow); *Schluter v. Burlington Ditch,
Reservoir & Land Co., 117 Colo. 284, 188 P.2d 253 (1947) (re: flow tributary to
stream; action to quiet title to seepage water alleged to be tributary to stream);
*Dalpez v. Nix, 96 Colo. 540, 45 P.2d 176 (1935) (re: flow tributary to stream;
adjudication of seepage water alleged to be tributary to stream); *Leadville Mine
Dev. Co. v. Anderson, 91 Colo. 536, 17 P.2d 303 (1932) (re: flow tributary to
stream; drainage from mine tunnel alleged to be tributary to stream; *Nevius
v. Smith, 86 Colo. 178, 279 P. 44 (1929) (re: flow tributary to stream; proposed
diversion of groundwater would reduce flow in stream); *Ft. Morgan Reservoir
& Irrigation Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo. 256, 206 P. 393 (1922) (re: flow tributary to stream; challenge to state agency order allowing interception of percolating groundwater alleged to be tributary to stream); *Clark v. Ashley, 34
Colo. 285, 82 P. 588 (1905) (re: flow tributary to stream; spring water diversion
reduced flow in stream); *Bruening v. Dorr, 23 Colo. 195, 47 P. 290 (1896)
(re: flow tributary to stream; springwater diversion reduced flow in stream);
*Ogilvy Irrigating & Land Co. v. Insinger, 19 Colo. App. 380, 75 P. 598 (1904) (re:
flow tributary to stream; interception of drainage waters reduced flow in stream);
*Leonard v. Shatzer, 11 Mont. 422, 28 P. 457 (1892) (dictum re: flow tributary to
stream; diversion of spring water alleged to be tributary to stream); *Strait v.
Brown, 16 Nev. 317 (1881) (re: flow tributary to stream; spring water diversion
reduced stream flow); *City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 71 N.M. 428, 379 P.2d
73 (1962) (re: flow tributary to stream; application to divert groundwater allegedly
not part of base flow of river); *Templeton v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy
Dist., 65 N.M., 59, 332 P.2d 465 (1958) (re: flow tributary to stream; application to
change diversion point from river to wells pumping from aquifer allegedly feeding
river); *Midway Irrigation Co. v. Snake Creek Mining & Tunnel Co., 271 F. 157
(8th Cir. 1921), affd, *260 U.S. 596 (1923) (applying Utah law and counted
twice in the tables because of different discussion on appeal) (re: flow tributary to
stream; action to quiet title from drainage tunnel allegedly tributary to stream);
"Silver King Consol. Mining Co. v. Sutton, 85 Utah 297, 39 P.2d 682 (1934) (re:
flow tributary to stream where groundwater was located on public domain at time
of stream water appropriation; action to quiet title to mine drainage water allegedly tributary to stream); "Bastian v. Nebeker, 49 Utah 390, 163 P. 1092 (1916)
(dictum re: flow tributary to stream; well field alleged to have reduced flow in
spring-fed stream); *Mountain Lake Mining Co. v. Midway Irrigation Co., 47
Utah 346, 149 P. 929 (1915) (re: flow tributary to stream; action to quiet title to
mine drainage alleged to have formerly fed stream); *Howcroft v. Union & Jordon
Irrigation Co., 25 Utah 311, 71 P. 487 (1903) (re: subflow of stream; proposed
diversion of seepage water would reduce stream flow); OHerriman Irrigation Co.
v. Keel, 25 Utah 96, 69 P. 719 (1902) (re: identifiable flow tributary to stream;
mining tunnel intercepted groundwater feeding stream); *Herriman Irrigation
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Co. v. Butterfield Mining Co., 19 Utah, 453, 57 P. 537 (1899) (re: flow tributary
to stream; mining tunnel intercepted groundwater feeding stream).
3. Other Special Rules Followed
a. Prescription
*Balston v. Bensted, 1 Camp. 463, 170 Eng. Rep. 1022 (N.P. 1808) (obsolete
doctrine based on long use; quarry drainage cut off spring-fed stream).
b. Ultra Vires Act
Spaulding v. Plainville, 218 Mass. 321, 105 N.E. 1006 (1914); Hart v. Jamaica
Pond Aqueduct Corp., 133 Mass. 488 (1882).
B. Pumping or GroundwaterDrainage Lowers Water Table and Reservoir Level
1. Percolating Groundwater Rules Followed
a. Absolute Ownership
None.
b. Reasonable Use
OSmith v. City of Brooklyn, 18 App. Div. 340, 46 N.Y.S. 141 (1897) (well field
dried up pond).
c. Correlative Rights
None.
d. Common Pool
None.
2. Surface Watercourse Rules Followed
a. Riparian Rights
i. Natural Flow Doctrine
*Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 115 Conn. 477, 234 A.2d 825 (1967)
(wells adjacent to streamside lagoon lower river level and interfere with fishing,
swimming and boating).
ii. Reasonable Use Doctrine
None.
b. Prior Appropriation
None.
3. Other Special Rules Followed
None.
C. Raised Reservoir Level Obstructs Groundwater Drainage and Raises Water
Table
1. Percolating Groundwater Rules Followed
a. Absolute Ownership
White River Chair Co. v. Connecticut River Power Co., 105 Vt. 24, 162
A. 859 (1932) (new reservoir flooded land by percolation); Harwood v. Benton &
Jones, 32 Vt. 724 (1860) (raising of reservoir level raised water table and flooded
land by percolation).
b. Reasonable Use
None.
c. Correlative Rights
*Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862) (dam raised water table).
d. Common Pool
None.
2. Surface Watercourse Rules Followed
a. Riparian Rights
i. Natural Flow Doctrine
None.
ii. Reasonable Use Doctrine
None.
b. Prior Appropriation
None.
3. Other Special Rules Followed
a. Trespass-Flooding Compensation
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Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Van Dobson, 14 Tenn. App. 54 (1932) (dictum;
reservoir made land too wet for cultivation).
D. Diversion from Stream Draws More Flow from Groundwater and Reduces
Well or DrainageYield
1. Percolating Groundwater Rules Followed
a. Absolute Ownership
*Garner v. Town of Milton, 846 Mass. 617, 195 N.E.2d 65 (1964) (lowering
of quarry pond lowered water table; house foundation cracked from soil compaction).
b. Reasonable Use
None.
c. Correlative Rights
None.
d. Common Pool
None.
2. Surface Watercourse Rules Followed
a. Riparian Rights
i. Natural Flow Doctrine
None.
ii. Reasonable Use Doctrine
None.
b. Prior Appropriation
None.
3. Other Special Rules Followed
E.

GroundwaterPollution Degrades Stream
I. Percolating Groundwater Rules Followed
a. Absolute Ownership
Rarick v. Smith, 17 Pa. County Ct. 627 (1896) (dictum; industrial wastes discharged into sinkhole polluted stream).
b. Reasonable Use
None.
c. Correlative Rights
None.
d. Common Pool
None.
2. Surface Watercourse Rules Followed
a. Riparian Rights
i. Natural Flow Doctrine
*Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886) (dictum;
acid mine wastes drained from tunnel were diverted into stream, polluting it).
ii. Reasonable Use Doctrine
None.
b. Prior Appropriation
None.
3. Other Special Rules Followed
a. Nuisance
*Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126 A. 386 (1924) (acid
mine wastes percolating from spoil heap polluted reservoir used for public water
supply and locomotive water supply); *Rarick v. Smith, 17 Pa. County Ct. 627
(1896) (re: non-natural use of land).
b. Natural Mine Drainage
*Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886); *Mountain
Water Supply Co. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 3 Pa. D. &cC. 187 (C.P. 1922) (same facts
as Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co.).
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